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THE FEDERAL BANK COMMISSION ACT:
A PROPOSAL TO CONSOLIDATE THE FEDERAL
BANKING AGENCIES
R ECENT BANK FAILURES HAVE SPARKED a new momentum for bank
regulatory reform. The past four years have seen the failure of
three multi-million dollar commercial banks: Franklin National Bank,
New York, declared insolvent on October 8, 1974; United States National
Bank, San Diego, closed its doors on October 18, 1973; and Hamilton
National Bank, Chattanooga, closed on February 16, 1976.1 These
failures have shaken public confidence in banking institutions, but,
more importantly, have demonstrated weaknesses in banking regulation.
As background to an examination of the Federal Bank Commission
Act,2 this Note will explore the two most important causes of the defi-
ciencies in the present commercial banking system. The first cause
is the existence of a "dual banking" system, under which banks may
choose between state or federal charters. The resulting division of
regulatory authority encourages banks to "shop" for the most favorable
regulation.3 The second major cause of deficiencies in the banking
system is the three-tiered organization of federal regulation. 4 The Act
I N.Y. Times, Feb. 29, 1976, at 2, col. 5.
2 S. 684, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. S2470 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 1977).
3 See generally Redford, Dual Banking: A Case Study in Federalism, 31 LAW & CoN-
TEMP. PROB. 749 (1966).
' The three federal regulatory agencies are: the Comptroller of the Currency, re-
sponsible for administration of national banks; the Federal Reserve Board, which formu-
lates monetary policy and regulates all banks which are members of the Federal Reserve
System; and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), which provides protec-
tion for depositors of member banks and insured nonmember banks through insurance and
supervisory functions. The interrelationship of these three agencies will be examined
throughout this Note.
The following chart depicts the relationship among the banking regulatory agencies
and the bank classes which they regulate.
CHARTER FEDERAL CHARTERI
B NATIONALBANK CLASS BANKS
COMPTROLLER FEDERAL FEDERALREGULATORY OF THE RESERVE DEPOSIT
AGENCY CURRENCY BOARD INSURANCE
CORPORATION
(FDIC)
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consolidates the three federal agencies into a single regulatory Commis-
sion. Emphasis also will be placed on the Act's effect on the dual
banking system, with a view toward improving the overall structure of
banking regulation.
I. STATUTORY AND ADMINISTRATIVE BACKGROUND
A. The Present Regulatory Scheme
The banking system is comprised of four bank classes. The bank
class determines which agency or agencies will regulate a particular
bank. National banks, chartered under federal law, 5 are supervised
primarily by the Comptroller of the Currency,6 but also are subject to
regulation by the Federal Reserve Board by reason of mandatory mem-
bership in that system and to regulation by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC).7 All banks chartered under state law are subject
to regulation by the state banking authority exercising jurisdiction over
the bank charter. State banks are also divided into three classes. Those
which are voluntary members of the Federal Reserve System are subject
to supervision by the Federal Reserve Board and by the FDIC;' state
banks which are insured by the FDIC but are not members of the Federal
Reserve System, are subject to regulation by the FDIC;9 and state banks
CHARTER STATE CHARTER
I I
STATE STATE STATE
BANK CLASS MEMBER NONMEMBER NONINSUREDBANKS INSURED BANKS
BANKS
REGULATORY FEDERALAGENCY RESERVE DI BANKINGBOARD AGENCY_
5 12 U.S.C. §9 21-28 (1970).
' See notes 12-13 infra and accompanying text for the history of the establishment of
the Office of the Comptroller to supervise national banks. 12 U.S.C. § 222 (1970).
7 12 U.S.C. §§ 222-23 (1970). The Federal Reserve Board statutes particularly perti-
nent to national banks include 12 U.S.C. §§ 343, 347 (1970); id. § 347b (Supp. IV 1974)
(discounts or advances to member banks by a Federal Reserve Bank); id. § 461 (1970)
(required reserve balances); id. § 601 (1970) (creation of foreign branches by national
banks); id. § 371b (1970) (limitations on savings and time deposits and on interest); id.
§ 375a (1970) (loans to national bank officers). National Banks also must be insured by
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. 12 U.S.C. §§ 282, 501a (1970).
8 12 U.S.C. § 321 (1970).
9 Id. § 1820b (1970).
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which are neither insured by the FDIC nor members of the Federal Re-
serve system are subject only to state regulation.
The three federal administrative agencies - the Comptroller of the
Currency, the Federal Reserve Board, and the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation - evolved in different historical periods to effectuate varied
economic and regulatory purposes. The present structure has been aptly
characterized as "an amalgam of coincidence and inadvertence."'10
Until 1863, all banks were state-chartered institutions with the ex-
ception of the two banks of the United States which existed for short
periods during the nineteenth century." The national banking system
began with the passage of the National Currency Act of 1863.12 This
Act authorized the chartering of national bank associations and the
corresponding issuance of national bank notes. Supervision of the bank-
ing associations was vested in the Currency Bureau of the Treasury
Department, headed by the Comptroller of the Currency. The Currency
Act was superseded in 1864 by the National Bank Act, which estab-
lished the modem legal framework for national bank regulation.13 The
National Bank Act left intact the Office of the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency.
The second and third tiers of the federal regulatory system emerged
largely in response to crises in banking history. The Federal Reserve
System was established in 191314 in response to the financial panic of
1907.15 After the stock market crash of 1929 and the subsequent bank
failures of the 1930's, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation was
developed in 193316 to protect depositors in the event of bank failures.1
7
Because the federal banking agencies were developed in response
to banking crises rather than as part of an integrated regulatory scheme, a
10 Hearings on S. 2298 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Af-
fairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 65 (1975) (statement of J. L. Robertson) [hereinafter cited as
1975 Hearings on S. 2298].
ll R. ROBERTSON, THE COMPaIOLLER AND BANK SUPERVISION: A HISTORICAL APPRAISAL
19 (1968). The first Bank of the United States was established in 1791 but was disbanded
in 1811 when the fear of expanding federal bank supervision led to congressional opposi-
tion to the bank's recharter. The demise of the second Bank of the United States, char-
tered in 1816, came in 1832 when President Jackson vetoed the congressional bill to
recharter the bank.
11 Act of Feb. 25, 1863, ch. 58, 12 Stat. 665.
13 Act of June 3, 1864, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99. Generally, the National Bank Act re-
quired that incorporators of national banking associations file articles of association with
the Comptroller. Minimum capital requirements were instituted; the requirements varied
depending upon the population of the association's service area. See R. ROBERTSON, supra
note 11, at 49. The modem rules for the incorporation of national banks may be found in
12 U.S.C. §§ 21-28 (1970).
14 Act of Dec. 23, 1913, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251.
10 See G. FIscHm, AMERICAN BANKING STucTuRE 186-88 (1968), for a historical ac-
count of the financial panic of 1907 and its influence on the enactment of the Federal
Reserve Act of 1913.
16 Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 168. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion was originally organized under authority of the Banking Act of 1933, as section 12B
of the Federal Reserve Act. In 1950 the Act was amended, withdrawn from the Federal
Reserve Act, and reinstituted as the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-
1831 (1970).
17 R. ROBERTSON, supra note 11, at 126. See also 12 U.S.C. § 1813 (1970).
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commercial bank may enjoy competitive advantages depending on the
regulatory agency governing its bank class.
B. Competitive Inequalities Among Differing Bank Classes:
A Case for Consolidation
The competitive inequalities among the four bank classes suggest a
need for reform of commercial bank regulation. Some of the disparity
among classes is attributable to the statutes and regulations, which grant
different powers and impose different requirements on banks dependent
upon their bank class. Most of the inquality, however, stems from the
fact that federal regulatory authority is divided among three different
agencies. When presented with the same policy issues, the three agencies
often respond inconsistently.' Although an understanding of both types
of inequalities is necessary to recognize the deficiences within the com-
mercial banking system, only the inequalities attributable to inconsis-
tent agency standards may be resolved through the agency consolida-
tion proposed by the Federal Bank Commission Act.
1. Statutory Inequalities Among the Bank Classes
Statutes which grant different powers to and impose different re-
quirements on banks according to bank class are one source of com-
petitive inequalfties among commercial banks. These statutes are in-
terpreted and applied by the regulating agency in the form of adminis-
trative rulings published in the Federal Register.9  Most of the
competitive advantages have been granted to national banks through
broad statutory delegations of power and through liberal Comptroller
rulings interpreting these statutes. The advantages are counterbalanced
to some extent by the stringent reserve requirements of the Federal
Reserve Board; these requirements apply to all national banks.
Because national banks derive most of their powers from federal
statute,20 courts have held them to be federal instrumentalities. This
court-fashioned federal instrumentality doctrine has traditionally held
national banks immune from state interference and control.21  The
doctrine has been modified somewhat in recent years. For example,
in 1972 federal law expressly subjected national banks to state sales and
use taxes. 22  Generally, national banks are now considered subject to
s Bank merger approvals are a good example. See notes 47-67 infra and accom-
panying text; 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (1970).
19 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)(D) (1970).
20 See notes 12-13 supra and accompanying text.
21 See, e.g., State Nat'l Bank v. Laura, 45 Misc. 2d 430, 256 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (1965),
(New York statute, which limited the right of unqualified foreign corporations to sue in
state court, was inapplicable to a national bank on the ground that the national bank
was excluded from the purview of the state statute by reason of the bank's creation
under federal law). See also Owensboro Nat'l Bank v. Owensboro, 173 U.S. 664 (1899)
(national banks exempt from state taxation under the federal instrumentality doctrine).
22 The National Bank Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 91-156, §§ 1(a), 2(a), as amended, 12
U.S.C. § 548 (Supp. IV 1974), reads: "For the purpose of any tax law enacted under author-
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state laws unless those laws conflict with federal regulatory statutes
or "impose undue burdens" on the performance of national banking
functions.23  National banks, however, continue to transcend state
restrictions on interstate operations. A national bank may not, without
its consent, be sued in any state or federal court except those in the
country or judicial district in which it is located.24 This immunity af-
fords a distinct competitive advantage to national banks engaged in
substantial interstate operations, 25 since state banks are subject to suit
in any state in which they are found to be "doing business" within
the broad jurisdictional guidelines of the minimum contacts theory or the
"doing business statutes."2 6  State banks engaged in interstate com-
merce are, therefore, subject to suit in a considerably larger number of
forums than are their federally chartered counterparts.
Perhaps the most far-reaching advantage national banks have is
granted through an incidental powers clause,27 which authorizes a na-
tional bank to exercise "all such incidental powers as shall be necessary
to carry on the business of banking." 28  In the last fifteen years, the
Comptroller of the Currency has broadly construed this provision to al-
low national banks considerable innovation in banking services.
29
ity of the United States or any State, a national bank shall be treated as a bank organized
and existing under the laws of the State or other jurisdiction within which its principal
office is located."
The purpose of this 1969 amendment, which became effective January 1973, was to
remove the immunity from state taxation previously granted to national banks. States
were thereby allowed, for tax purposes, to treat national and state banks in the same
manner. See Lake County Nat'l Bank v. Kosydar, 36 Ohio St. 2d 189, 305 N.E.2d 799
(1973).
23 Brown v. United Community Nat'l Bank, 282 F. Supp. 781 (D.D.C. 1968); McKee &
Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 265 F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Cal. 1967), afi'd, 397 F.2d 248 (9th Cir. 1968).
In national bank branch decisions, state law applies even though state statutes may im-
pose burdens upon national banks. For a general discussion of the demise of the federal
instrumentality doctrine see Schwind & O'Leary, Are National Banks Federal Instrumen-
talities Today?, 86 BANKINc L.J. 99 (1969).
24 Michigan Nat'l Bank v. Robertson, 372 U.S. 591 (1963); Merchantile Nat'l Bank v.
Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555 (1963); Bruns, Nordenman & Co. v. American Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co., 394 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 855 (1968). This immunity
from state restrictions on interstate operations is based upon interpretation of 12 U.S.C.
§ 94 (1970). But see Central Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Superior Ct., 30 Cal. App. 3d 962, 106
Cal. Rptr. 913 (1973) (venue existed in any county in which the national bank operated a
branch office).
2' An example of interstate operations is the interstate sale of traveler's checks.
26 Hackley, Our Discriminatory Banking Structure, 55 VA. L. REV. 1421, 1432-34
(1969). A state bank, like any other corporation, is subject to the broad jurisdictional
guidelines of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), while national
banks enjoy a special immunity in interstate operations pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 94
(1970). See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
v 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (1970).
2' Id. Both the language and usage of the incidental powers clause appear to be pat-
terned after the "necessary and proper clause" of the United States Constitution, U.S.
CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 18. As interpreted, these clauses afford broad implied powers to
national banks (incidental powers clause) and to Congress (necessary and proper clause)
beyond the enumerated powers expressly conferred by statute. For a general discussion
of the commerce clause and the necessary and proper clause see D. ENGDAHL, CONSnTU-
TIONAL PowEa: FEDERAL AND STATE IN A NUTSHELL § 5.04-.05 (1974).
2 Hackley, supra note 26, at 1435-6; F.I.N.E. STUDY RESPONSES BY THE COMPTROLLER OF
THE CURRENCY TO THE BANKING, CURRENCY, AND HOUSING COMM. AND THE SUBCOMM. ON
4791976]
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Most notably, the Comptroller expanded national banking powers in the
areas of travel services,3 0 direct leasing of personal property,3' and data
processing.32
The Comptroller's favorable rulings awarded national banks a com-
petitive advantage both within and without the banking industry. These
regulatory rulings resulted in litigation, through which national bank
expansion was dampened but not thwarted.33 As a result, the larger
national banks that maintained capital to venture into broad service
offerings emerged champions of vertical integration.
3 4
It should be noted that continued bank expansion into the services
area may change the complexion of the banking industry. Banking institu-
tions may become suppliers of varied services to the same extent that
they presently engage in traditional banking activities. As banks enter
the services industry, they will compete with nonbank businesses, such
as travel and auto leasing agencies, as well as with other financial
institutions. Moreover, the competition between banks will be based on
factors other than price, such as the ability of existing banks to expand
into the services market. While some authors argue that such innova-
FINANaAL INsnTruONS, REULATIONS AND INSURANCE, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 186-
188 (1975), [hereinafter cited as F.I.N.E. S'tun RESPONSES] (on file in the offices of the
Cleveland State Law Review).
30 The Comptroller, in 12 C.F.R. § 7.7475 (1963), reaffirmed the banking practice
of selling travel services to bank customers; the practice was originally approved by the
office in 1935. This ruling was modified in Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 472 F.2d 427
(1st Cir. 1972), in which the sale of travel services was held invalid to the extent that it
authorized the national bank operation of a "full-scale travel agency." See also Ameri-
can Soc'y of Travel Agents v. Bank of America Natl Trust & Say. Ass'n, 385 F. Supp. 1084
(N.D. Cal. 1974) (when a national bank agreed with a travel bureau to assume the ven-
ture's financial risks and to proffer the bank's name and reputation to that venture, the
bank engaged in the travel business and its activities were no longer within the protective
provisions of 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (1970)).
3' 12 C.F.R. § 7.3400 (1976) (permitted national banks to purchase, upon specific re-
quest of a customer, equipment for direct lease to that customer. Such leases have been
upheld as incidental to banking functions, and construed as the functional equivalent of a
bank loan). See also analogous Federal Reserve regulations controlling the leasing ac-
tivities of bank holding companies in 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a) (1976).
- 12 C.F.R. § 7.3500 (1976).
33 See, e.g., note 30 supra. Most plaintiffs in this litigation were either state banks or
service delivery institutions, which felt threatened by the seemingly unending expansion
of national banks into traditionally nonbanking services areas. See Saxon v. Georgia
Ass'n of Independent Insur. Agents, 399 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1968) (group of insurance
agents deterred national bank expansion into the insurance industry in cities of more than
five thousand persons); M & M Leasing Corp. v. Seattle First Nat'l Bank, 391 F. Supp. 1290
(W.D. Wash. 1975) (unsuccessful suit by local auto leasing agents to check national bank
entrance into motor vehicle leasing).
34 Since 1963, when the Supreme Court adopted a "hard line" against horizontal bank
mergers in United States v. Philadelphia Natl Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963), banks have
tended to engage in mergers of the market and product extension variety. See, e.g.,
United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602 (1974) (market extension). Mar-
ket extension mergers involve banks in different markets, which are not direct competitors.
Product extension mergers involve banks which may or may not be competitors but which
produce complementary products. When banks expand into broad "nonbank" service of-
ferings, they are acquiring new inputs (travel service operations, leasing activities) in or-
der to make a more attractive final "product" package for bank customers. In this sense,
bank product expansion into traditionally nonbank areas is essentially a conglomerate
form of vertical integration.
[Vol. 25:475
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tion has a positive effect on competition in the banking industry, it
would appear that the banks which survive such "economic warfare"
will do so based upon their relative size and their ability to absorb
potential losses.35  This increased reliance on services expansion may
decrease the number of competitors in a given area if smaller banks
are forced into merger or liquidation due to their inability to raise the
capital prerequisite for expansion.36
The Federal Reserve Act also offers competitive advantages to banks
which are members of the Federal Reserve System.37 Some of the
advantages of Federal Reserve membership are intra-agency services
including the System's check collection services and free deliveries of coin
and currency from the district Federal Reserve Bank.38  A more substan-
tive advantage to membership is derived from the Federal Reserve's role
of extending credit to member banks "to accommodate commerce,
industry and agriculture.- 3 9  The extent of this benefit, however, is
somewhat diminished by the central bank's authority to extend credit to
nonmember institutions in emergency situations.
40
Many commentators argue that a significant disadvantage to Fed-
eral Reserve membership stems from the reserve balances that each
member bank is required to maintain on deposit with the Federal Re-
serve Bank of its district.41 These balances constitute specified per-
centages of the bank's time and demand deposits. 42 While both com-
-1 F.I.N.E. STUDY RESPONSES, supra note 29, at 245; Havrilesky, Banking and the
Economy, in COMPENDIUM OF MAjon IssuES IN BANK REGULATION, printed for the use of
the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 123
(1975) [hereinafter cited as COMPENDIUM]; Kreps, Modernizing Bank Regulation, 31
LAw & Coi'ramp. Pao. 648, 671 (1966).
- Shull, Bank Expansion: The New Competition and the Old Predatory Practices, 91
BANKING L.J. 726, 729 (1974). Some economists contend that the decrease in number of
small banks through merger is not always detrimental to market competition. The crea-
tion of medium-sized banks through merger of smaller firms may challenge the market
power of a dominant firm in the same market and intensify competitive rivalry; however,
the same merger may create a hazard to the continued survival of smaller firms, since it
may trigger a series of mergers and thereby significantly increase absolute concentration
in banking markets. See E. SINcER, ANTrrnusr EcoNosrlcs: SELECrED LEGAL CASES AND
EcoNoMIc MODELS 134-35 (1968). Further empirical data is needed to determine the
extent to which smaller banks are forced out of business because of their inability to
modernize and expand at a pace consistent with their larger market rivals.
In addition to the potential decrease in the number of banks, one commentator has
suggested that the following dangers may result from an increased reliance on nonprice
competition in commercial banking markets: (a) development of "uneconomic" barriers to
entry; (b) creation of conditions which will require the creation of new standards for
chartering and branching activities; (c) increased inefficiencies in the production of
banking services as institutions expend more effort and time in expanding traditionally
nonbank services; and (d) diminution in bank profits and capital adequacy. See Havrile-
sky, supra note 35, at 134-35.
17 The Federal Reserve System is comprised of all national banks and state-chartered
institutions which are voluntary members of that system. 12 U.S.C. §§ 222-23, 321
(1970).
38 12 C.F.R. § 210 (1976).
12 C.F.R. § 201.2(a) (1976).
o 12 C.F.R. § 201.2(f) (1976).
41 12 U.S.C. § 461 (1970). See note 44 infra and accompanying text.
- 12 U.S.C. § 461 (1970).
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mentators and bankers argue that the reserve requirements for member
banks are higher than those set by state banking authorities for non-
member banks, at least one study has demonstrated that, in fact, the
opposite pattern exists. 43
Although the actual level of required reserves should not discourage
Federal Reserve membership, restrictions on the form of such reserves
may chill the appeal of membership status. Member banks must main-
tain reserves in the form of vault cash or reserve deposits at the district
Federal Reserve Bank,44 and these balances must consist solely of non-
earning assets. By contrast, nonmember banks may hold their reserves
in a variety of forms including vault cash, correspondent balances at
other banks, cash items in the process of collection, certificates of
deposit, and governmental securities. 45  A further advantage afforded to
nonmember reserves exists in the approximately twenty-five states which
permit these balances to earn interest. 46  The competitive disadvantage
associated with member reserves thus increases proportionally with
increases in the degree of flexibility which a state banking authority
grants to nonmember reserve holdings, particularly with respect to the
rate of return obtainable through such holdings.
2. Inequalities Based on Inconsistent Agency Standards
Because a particular bank may be regulated by one or more dif-
ferent agencies, dependent upon its classification, further competitive
inequalities among bank classes may result from the conflicting inter-
agency policies which regulate a type of banking transaction. Such in-
ter-agency discord may be illustrated through merger and branch ap-
proval patterns.
43 Klein, A Paper Prepared for the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Af-
fairs, in COMPNDIJM, supra note 35, at 207-09. State nonmember banks are usually re-
quired to establish separate reserve accounts within the banks themselves; state member
banks are required to maintain reserves on deposit with the Federal Reserve Bank of their
district. The 1971 study indicated that reserve requirements on demand deposits for non-
member banks were lower than those set by the Federal Reserve in only 15 states; 10
states had identical requirements; and 25 states had higher reserve requirements on non-
member banks. In states where member bank reserve requirements on demand deposits
were lower than those imposed on nonmember banks, in only two states did the number
of member banks exceed nonmember institutions. Similar data was obtained for require-
ments on time deposits. These figures indicate that the requirements for holding the
reserves in non-interest earning assets, rather than the actual amount of reserves re-
quired, is the controlling factor in determining whether state banks volunteer for Federal
Reserve membership. See notes 44-46 infra and accompanying text.
44 12 C.F.R. § 204.5 (1976).
45 The advantages to holding reserves in interest-bearing assets, such as Treasury Bills,
may be illustrated by an examination of the rate of return earned on such securities by
nonmember banks. During 1973, nonmember bank reserves invested in three-month
bills yielded an average return of 7.03 percent, more than double the rate of return in
1963. These figures may explain the accelerating exodus of state banks from the Fed-
eral Reserve System. Boehne, Falling Federal Reserve Membership and Eroding Monc-
tary Control: What Can Be Done?, in CURRENT PERSPECTIVES IN BANKING: OPERATIONS,
MANAGEMENT, AND REGULATION 534 (T. Havrilesky & J. Boorman ed. 1976). See aLso
Klein, supra note 43, at 209-11.
46 For a list of these states, see Klein, supra note 43, at 211.
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All three federal regulators share authority for merger decisions. 47
The scope of their authority is dependent upon the character of the sur-
viving entity. The Federal Reserve Board maintains jurisdiction in
merger cases when the surviving institution is a state member bank. 4
When the survivor is a national bank or a state nonmember insured
bank, Comptroller or FDIC approval is required. 49  The Comptroller
has primary and exclusive approval jurisdiction over domestic branch
decisions involving national banks;50 the Federal Reserve Board and the
FDIC perform secondary approval functions over branch decisions of
state banks which are members of the Federal Reserve System or which
retain FDIC insurance. Y
Of the three federal agencies, the Comptroller is generally the most
lenient in merger approvals. This leniency reflects the Office's policy
of encouraging bank expansion, both in terms of diversification of ser-
vices and actual size.5 2  The agency contends that bank mergers are
procompetitive, stimulating competition through the creation of addi-
tional consumer services or through the advent of better management.
3
The problem with the Comptroller's approach is that the substantial
disparity in the size of banks, which is encouraged by a liberal merger
policy, is contrary to the forms of competition which the antitrust laws
are designed to protect. The underlying assumption of the federal an-
titrust laws is that numerous independent competing firms provide
greater competition in the marketplace than do a few large firms which
dominate an industry.54 Data on whether an industry composed of firms
of approximately the same size would be more competitive than an
47 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (1970).
4 Id.
41Id.
- 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1970).
5' 12 U.S.C. §§ 321, 1828(d) (1970).
52 See Hackley, Our Discriminatory Banking Structure, 55 VA. L. REv. 1421, 1458
(1969). Note also the Comptroller's high merger approval rate, note 65 infra.
F.I.N.E. STuDY RESPONSES, supra note 29, at 245.
In oligopolistic markets, a few sellers dominate the distribution of a homogeneous
product. The oligopolistic market grants to its member firms the power, whether or not
utilized, to establish prices and outputs and, thus, to subordinate the role of competition
to the firms' desire for profit maximization. A comparison of the pricing policies in
oligopolistic and competitive markets indicates that prices are more rigid and less respon-
sive to economic variables, such as demand, in oligopolistic industries. See E. SINGER,
ANTITRUST ECONOMICS: SELECTED CASES AND ECONOMIC MODELS 100 (1968). Each seller
will seek to price similarly to avoid retaliatory price reductions by other sellers which, in
turn, would reduce overall profits and revenues for all. This conscious "parallel busi-
ness behavior," however, is not a per se violation of the federal antitrust laws. For ex-
ample, a uniform restriction by film distributors and producers of "first run" movies to
downtown Baltimore theaters was insufficient behavior to establish an unlawful conspiracy
under section 1 of the Sherman Act. Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Dis-
trib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954). Other collusive conduct by sellers in oligopoly markets,
however, may violate the antitrust laws. See, e.g., United States v. Parke, Davis & Co.,
362 U.S. 29 (1960) (company policy of terminating drug wholesalers who sold to price-
cutting retailers constituted conduct violative of section 1 of the Sherman Act); United
States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927) (defense of reasonableness imma-
terial to charge of direct price-fixing of vitreous pottery by manufacturer and distributor
members of a potters' trade association).
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industry with firms of different sizes, is inconclusive. There is sig-
nificant evidence, however, that domination of an industry by a few
large firms is anticompetitive in that it allows for administered pric-
ing.56 While a liberal bank merger policy does not force these anti-
competitive practices, it does produce a more concentrated banking
industry in which to achieve collusive behavior.
In contrast to the Comptroller's merger policy, the Federal Reserve
Board is the most stringent in its examination of proposed mergers.
Recognizing the potential anticompetitive effects of bank mergers, the
Board has adopted the "potential competition" doctrine. Advanced by
the Justice Department, this doctrine opposes approval of acquisition of a
large bank in one local market by a large bank located in a separate
local market, even though there is no apparent competition between the
two institutions at the time of the proposed merger or acquisition. 57
It would appear that evidence of the potential anticompetitive effects
of a proposed merger should be sufficient grounds for merger denial.
Although the entrance of a large bank into a new geographic market
may initially stimulate competition for depositors, the long-range
effect would appear to be anticompetitive. The elimination of com-
peting banks, as large banks drive local institutions out of business or
prevent them from becoming significant rivals in other markets,
58
appears more probable than not. The "potential competition" doctrine
only restricts mergers in a prescribed situation,59 and is, therefore, only
a "band-aid" approach to maintenance of competitive levels in the bank-
ing industry.
5 See generally E. SINGER, ANarrrusr ECONOMICS: SELEcTED LEGAL CASES AND
ECONOMIC MODELS 154-55 (1968).
- Oligopolistic sellers tend to price similarly. In order to maximize profits, they
tend to adjust output and employment levels to accommodate fluctuations in demand.
The term "administered prices" has been used to characterize this similar pricing. See id.
at 108 and authorities therein cited.
57 Shull, The Potential Competition Doctrine and Market Extension Acquisitions in
Banking, in CoMPENDIUM, supra note 35, at 728. A proposed merger may be held to
violate section 7 of the Clayton Act, 12 U.S.C. § 18 (1970), if it substantially lessens
competition within the relevant product market (the line of commerce) and geographic
market (section of the country). Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 324
(1962). For section 7 purposes, in at least two bank merger cases, the Supreme Court
defined commercial banking as the relevant "line of commerce" and the geographic mar-
ket as the place where the seller/banker operates. United States v. Phillipsburg Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co., 399 U.S. 350, 360-61 (1970); United States v. Philadelphia Natl
Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 358 (1963).
The Justice Department has expressed concern that three types of market extensions
through bank mergers may be prima facie violative of section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. § 18 (1970): (1) when a bank which is a statewide leader wishes to acquire a bank
in an area in which that leader is not presently competing; (2) when a bank in a metro-
politan area wishes to acquire a suburban bank with a strong position in its local market;
and (3) when a leading bank in a local market wishes to acquire a leading bank in another
local market into which the acquiring bank could enter de novo (through charter or
branch). Alcorn, Phillipsburg and Beyond - Developing Trends for Substantive Standards
for Bank Mergers, 9 Hous. L. REv. 421, 451 (1972).
"I Shull, Batik Expansion: The New Competition and the Old Predatory Practices, 91
BANKINC L.J. 726, 749 (1974).
- See note 57 supra and accompanying text.
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Even this limited approach has been severely undercut by the 1974
Supreme Court case of United States v. Marine Bancorporation,60 in
which the Court refused to apply the potential competition doctrine to
find an antitrust violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act.6' In Ma-
rine, a large bank, capable of entry into the Spokane, Washington mar-
ket either through sponsorship as a branch of an existing bank or through
charter, instead entered through merger with a medium-sized bank.
The merger thus deprived the Spokane market of competition that the
merging bank could have offered by means of the other modes of entry.6 2
Refusing to accept the government's contention that the merger
would decrease banking competition on a statewide basis, the Marine
Court limited the relevant geographic market for section 7 purposes to
the Spokane banking market. The Court then ruled that the finding
of an actual decrease in competition within this metropolitan area was
prerequisite to a section 7 violation,6- and that the government had
failed to demonstrate such a decrease. The Court further required proof
that entry by methods other than merger would foster competition within
the relevant market. A presumption was thereby created that proposed
bank mergers and acquisitions are procompetitive, and the government
could rebut this presumption only through satisfaction of an extremely
high burden of proof.6 4 A consequent retardation in antitrust prosecu-
tions of bank acquisitions is certain to follow.
As a result of this decision the Federal Reserve Board may, at least
temporarily, abandon the "potential competition" doctrine and adopt a
lenient merger approval policy similar to that of the Comptroller.6 5
Other factors also suggest this result. Bank conversions from state to
national charters and withdrawals by state member banks from the
Federal Reserve System, have become increasingly common during the
- 418 U.S. 602 (1974).
61 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
418 U.S. at 639-40.
3 The majority refused to accept the basic premise of the potential competition doc-
trine that the potential entrant, "waiting in the wings," exercises a present influence on
the market, or that a toehold entrant may have a substantial competitive effect by pre-
venting major banks in the geographic market from increasing their market shares. See
dissenting opinion of Justice White, id. at 644 (Justices Brennan and Marshall joining).
4 Id. at 639-40. The requirement that the government prove that alternative methods
of entry would foster competition as prerequisite to finding a section 7 violation is prob-
ably the most difficult aspect of this decision, since such proof is speculative at best. A
final stab at the potential competition doctrine was rendered in the majority's conclu-
sion that, absent unlimited branching authority in the relevant market, no new entrant
could emerge a substantial competitor to warrant prosecution under the potential compe-
tition doctrine. Because no state law affords unlimited branching authority, this conclusion
effectively eliminated application of the doctrine to future antitrust prosecutions of bank
mergers and acquisitions. See note 85 infra.
61 Hackley, Our Discriminatory Banking Structure, 55 VA. L. REV. 1421, 1459 (1969).
The following statistics indicate merger approval and denial rates by the three federal
bank regulators from 1960-72: Federal Reserve - approval rate 90.6%, denials 9.4%,
mergers construed as anticompetitive by the Justice Department, 50.0%; Comptroller -
approvals 98.9%, denials 1.1%, construed as anticompetitive by the Justice Department,
57.2%; FDIC - approvals 96.4%, denials 3.6%; construed as anticompetitive by the Justice
Department, 50.5%, overall averages - 97% approvals and 3% denials. See Reid, Legisla-
tion, Regulation, Antitrust, and Bank Mergers, 92 BANKuNc L.J. 1, 18 (1975).
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last fifteen years. Prompted by the competitive inequalities between
bank classes and sanctioned by federal statute, conversions have been
utilized by banks to pressure their regulators into a more liberal posi-
tion with regard to merger approvals. 6  The Federal Reserve Board is
very aware of the decline in its membership, and in an attempt to halt
withdrawals to nonmember status, it may become reluctant to adhere
to policies more restrictive than those advocated by other federal agen-
cies and by the banking industry at large.6 7
Branching issues further exemplify the diffusion of authority among
federal banking regulators. 68  Regulatory branching questions differ
substantially from those concerning mergers because state restrictions
play a greater role in branching cases. Also, while each of the federal
regulators retains primary jurisdiction over merger approvals, only the
Comptroller has primary approval in branch decisions. 69 Both the
Federal Reserve Board and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
have only secondary approval functions over state branches with respect
to state member banks and nonmember insured banks.70  Although
the Comptroller retains primary approval jurisdiction over those do-
mestic branch cases which concern national banks, that agency may not
approve a national branch on terms inconsistent with state law.
7
'
Because of the additional state dimension in branching decisions,
the federal inter-agency conflict in this area is less pronounced than it is
in merger decisions. For example, during the five-year period from 1969
to 1973 the Comptroller denied 13% of all branch applications. 72  By
contrast, and largely due to the secondary approval functions of the Fed-
eral Reserve Board and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the
6 See, e.g., the proposed merger between Bank of South Texas and First National
Bank of Alice. The FDIC was asked to approve the merger, but denied it as anticompeti-
tive in December 1974. In August 1975, the application was reconsidered and the mer-
ger granted. In the interim, no substantive change in circumstances had occurred; how-
ever, "the applicant had reminded the FDIC that the merger could be restructured to re-
sult in a national bank, under jurisdiction of the Comptroller rather than under the FDIC."
1975 Hearings on S. 2298, supra note 10, at 7 (statement of J. L. Robertson). See also
Brimmer, Market Structure, Public Convenience and the Regulation of Bank Mergers, 86
BANKING L.J. 771, 776-78 (1969), for a study of approval-denial rates regarding merger
applications before the three federal regulators.
17 See generally Boehne, Falling Fed Membership and Eroding Monetary Control:
What Can Be Done?, in CURRENT PERSPECTIVES IN BANKING: OPERATONS, MANAGE-
MENT, AND REGULATION 533 (T. Havrilesky & J. Boorman ed. 1976).
" See generally Scott, In Quest of Reason: The Licensing Decisions of the Federal
Banking Agencies, 42 U. CHI. L. REv. 235 (1975). Pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1970), the
Comptroller administers the establishment of national bank branches, whereas, the Fed-
eral Reserve Board must approve branches for state member banks (id. § 521) and the
FDIC for nonmember insured state banks (id. § 1828(d)). It should be noted that all
foreign branch decisions require approval of the Federal Reserve Board, regardless of the
bank class involved. ld. §§ 601, 521.
1 Scott, supra note 68, at 81-84.
70 Id. at 76-79.
71 In First Nat'l Bank v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385 U.S. 252 (1966), the Supreme
Court ruled that national branch banking is limited to those states which permit it and then
only to the extent permitted by state law. See also First Nat'l Bank v. Dickinson, 396
U.S. 122 (1969), reaffirming state restrictions on the establishment and operation of
national branches.
72 Scott, supra note 68, at 274.
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rejection rate of these two agencies was practically nil: 99% approvals
for the FDIC and almost 100% approvals for the Federal Reserve
Board.73  Actually, in the branching area there is intensive policy dis-
agreement among the federal regulators that is not reflected in the ap-
proval-denial rates.
Ascertainment of policy goals for branch decisions is difficult.
Neither the statutes governing these decisions nor two of the three fed-
eral regulators have set standards for branch approvals.74  Only the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation has indicated the specific cri-
teria considered in its branch approvals. These are: the financial his-
tory and condition of the bank; capital adequacy; future earnings pros-
pects; general character of bank management; public convenience and
community needs to be served by the proposed institution; and whether
the corporate powers are consistent with the purposes of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act.
7 5
One author sought to determine the Comptroller's objectives in its
approvals of national bank branch applications. 76  Upon obtaining ac-
cess to a random sample of files on charter applications, he discov-
ered that the Comptroller based branch approvals on whether the pro-
posed branch would be profitable. 77  The Comptroller's unilateral ap-
proach thus emerges in stark contrast to the multiplicity of factors con-
sidered by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation in its branch
decisions. Moreover, profitability appears to be a poor indicator on
which to base branching decisions, since it demonstrates little more
than the projected benefits of branch approval to the stockholders of
the branching bank.78  An examination of other factors, such as the
capital adequacy of the branch applicant and the potential anticompeti-
tive effects of the proposed branch site on the surrounding banking mar-
ket, would appear more proper indicia for branching decisions.
3 Id. at 275.
71 Id. at 288-94.
75 12 U.S.C. § 1816 (1970). Indirectly, the Federal Reserve Board has provided some
clue to the criteria which it uses in evaluating branch approval applications. The Board
urges that state member banks supplement branch applications with certain information,
including the scope and character of potential branch functions and the supervisory policy
of the home office to its branch. The Board will inform the branch applicant, through a
"simple statement," of the grounds for each case of branch denial. See 12 C.F.R. § 262.3
(e) (1976).
76 Provoked by the "determined resistance" of the Comptroller and other banking
agencies to provide applicants with "intelligible expanations of licensing decisions,"
Professor Kenneth Scott undertook to determine the regulatory criteria for branch and
charter decisions. Scott, In Quest of Reason: The Licensing Decisions of the Federal
Banking Agencies, 42 U. CHi. L. REv. 235, 288 (1975).
" Professor Scott noted that profitability in a services industry is usually determined
through a perception of "public need": the willingness of the public to pay for a service
and the extent to which actual or projected payment exceeds costs of delivery. Pro-
fessor Scott's examination of the national bank branch files, however, revealed that the
Comptroller employed less stringent standards to project profitability in the proposed
branch area, for instance, whether the other banks in the area could sufficiently serve
their customers without the proposed branch. Id. at 284-85.
" Id. at 285. Professor Scott further questioned whether the Comptroller can ef-
ficiently project branch earnings figures, for, in fact, the applicant may be better equipped
to determine bank profitability than the regulator.
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This "profitability" focus, however, is consistent with the Comp-
troller's regulatory approach in other areas, most notably, with respect
to its encouraged diversification of banking services79 and merger ex-
pansion8 0  All these policies have successfully attracted large state
banks to national bank status and secured substantial banking interests
within the agency's jurisdiction. 81 Consequently, the Comptroller has
promoted a new duality in banking, that of large versus small bank, in
contrast to the traditional duality of state versus nationally-chartered in-
stitutions.8 2
A final and timely example of this emphasis on bank expansion
emerges in the 1974 Comptroller ruling that electronic funds transfer
systems"' are not banking branches.84 Because state branching re-
strictions are often stringent8 and because the Supreme Court has held
79 See notes 29-33 supra and accompanying text.
80 See note 53 supra and accompanying text.
sI Of approximately 14,000 banks in the United States, 4,600 are nationally chartered.
Although constituting only 33% of the total commercial bank force, national banks account
for 605 of all bank assets. See Weiant & Wood, The Adequacy and Structure of Capital
for Banks and Bank Holding Companies, in COMPENDIUM, supra note 35, at 375-77.
82 Small banks primarily perform a "safekeeping and payments function" within their
service areas; in addition to performing this function, large banks are major intermedi-
aries in medium and long-term credit transactions. F.I.N.E. STUDY RESPoNsES, supra
note 29, at 12-13. Smaller banks also differ from larger institutions in the composition of
deposit concentrations. A significant proportion of their assets are concentrated within a
narrow geographical sphere and among a few depositors; by contrast, large banks secure
a broader representation of deposits from many customers. Id. at 14. Other differences
between large and small institutions concern loans and investments and are related to the
above discrepancies in function and in deposit concentration. For example, the small
bank is required to hold substantial liquid assets, so that it can respond to any "deposit
volatility" caused by its emphasis on the payments function and its high concentration
of deposits among a few customers. The large bank can safely maintain smaller liquid-
ity ratios due to its broader depositor base. Finally, the large bank's credit demands
dictate the development of highly diversified loan portfolios. Id. at 14-15.
3 Electronic funds transfer systems encompass a variety of computerized models
through which customer transactions may be accommodated without a visit to the bank
office during working hours. Generally, the systems function by means of an off-premise
terminal, connected by wire to the parent bank's central accounts computer. Comment,
Electronic Funds Transfer and Branch Banking - The Application of Old Law to New
Technology, 35 MD. L. REv. 88 n.3 (1975).
- 12 C.F.R. § 7.7491 (1976). In June 1975, the Comptroller modified this ruling to
restrict construction of electronic funds terminals by national banks to within fifty miles
of the bank's main office or closest branch office, unless the terminals were shared with
commercial banks, mutual savings banks, savings and loan associations, or credit unions.
This interpretive ruling was later formally rescinded at 41 Fed. Reg. 36,198 (1976). See
note 87 infra.
85 In 1975, only 21 states permitted statewide branching by commercial banks:
Alaska, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Louisiana, Maine,
Maryland, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and Washington. Wyoming had no branching statute,
although it recognized de facto branches. Of the remaining states, 12 prohibited
branching but permitted limited facilities, such as drive-in terminals; the 16 remaining
states permitted branching within limited geographic areas. See Table VI - Status of
State Branching Statutes, in 1975 Hearings on S. 2298, supra note 10, at 264. There is a
correlation between the scope of permissible branching and the geographic location: wide-
spread branching is concentrated in the western states; unit banking is most prevalent
between the Mississippi and the Rockies; and limited branching is characteristic of the
eastern states, although unit banking and statewide branching are also represented in
that region. See generally G. FIscHEa, AMEFUCAN BAr IoNc SmRucruRE 66-71 (1968).
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national branch banking subject to state restrictions,86 the Comptrol-
ler ruling attempted to circumvent state branching law under the guise
of electronic transfer terminals. The ruling has been formally rescinded
by court order;8 7 to date, the Supreme Court has refused to grant cer-
tiorari in these electronic funds transfer cases. 8   If national banks were
allowed to maintain such systems without the limitations of state branch-
ing laws, a result which could be obtained either by congressional leg-
islation or by Supreme Court decision, they could dominate the banking
industry. Electronic terminals are less expensive to operate than are
branches, 9 and computerized banking services could be easily mar-
keted through interstate commerce. 90
" First Nat'l Bank v. Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122, rehearing denied, 396 U.S. 1047 (1969);
First Nat Bank v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385 U.S. 252 (1966), rehearing denied, 395
U.S. 1032 (1967). Walker Bank & Trust is the leading case on construction of the McFad-
den Act, 13 Stat. 484, as codified and amended, 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1970), the statutory
authority for the establishment and operation of national bank branches, and it incorpor-
ated state branching restrictions into section 36(c) of that Act. Dickinson reaffirmed the
application of state law to national branches and further clarified the federal definition
of "branch" under section 36(f) of the McFadden Act, in effect ruling that any branch
which afforded a "competitive advantage" to a national bank constituted a section 36(f)
branch and was, therefore, subject to state branching law pursuant to section 36(c). 396
U.S. at 136-37.
Dickinson is ambiguous, however, on whether the federal definition of branch under
section 36(f) is preliminary to these considerations of state law application and of compet-
itive equality under section 36(c), or whether the section 36(f) branch definition initially
includes examination of the competitive effects. If the second construction is adopted
and the activity meets the definitional requirements of section 36(f), state branching re-
strictions are incorporated by federal definition. Comment, Electronic Funds Transfer
and Branch Banking - The Application of Old Law to New Technology, 35 MD. L. REV.
88, 100 (1975). The Comptroller capitalized on this ambiguity through its electronic
funds transfer ruling. Contending that the section 36(f) definition of branch is prelimi-
nary to application of state law under section 36(c), the Comptroller asserted that because
electronic systems are excluded from that definition, they are not subject to state branch-
ing restrictions.
1- On October 21, 1975, the Comptroller published notice that its interpretive ruling
on customer-bank communications terminals was suspended pending appellate court
decision in the case of Independent Bankers Ass'n of America v. Smith, 402 F. Supp. 207
(D.D.C. 1975). See 40 Fed. Reg. 49,077 (1975). The appellate court affirmed the dis-
trict court holding, which required that the Comptroller ruling be formally rescinded.
534 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Accordingly, the ruling was rescinded. 41 Fed. Reg.
36,198 (1976).
86 E.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Kostman, 429 U.S. 941 (1976); First Nat'l Bank v. Lignoul,
429 U.S. 871 (1976).
89 See Baker, Bank Expansion: Georgraphic Barriers, 91 BANING L.J. 707, 717 (1974);
F.I.N.E. STUDY RESPONSES, supra note 29, at 189. Automotic telling machines provide
particularly attractive prospects, since they can function twenty-four hours per day without
attendant personnel.
90 The potential anticompetitive effects of national electronic systems marketing
should be noted. Statewide branching jurisdictions tend to have higher resource concen-
trations in the hands of the largest banks than states which either prohibit or restrict
branching within the state; analogously high concentrations on a national level could be
anticipated if national banks were permitted to market electronic systems across state lines.
See correlations between statewide deposit concentrations and the type of branching
law enacted, note 191 infra. See also Kirby, The Name's the Thing: Financial Com-
munication Device, Not Automated Teller Machine, 91 BANKINc L.J. 135, 154 (1974)
(antitrust violations would occur only if larger banks develop shared electronic facilities
to the exclusion or detriment of smaller banks). Recent articles which generally explore
the antitrust issues raised by electronic funds transfer systems include: Bernard, Some
Antitrust Issues Raised by Large Electronic Funds Transfer - An Executive Perspective,
1976]
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At least four state banking authorities have successfully challenged
the 1974 Comptroller's ruling in federal court.91 In all of these cases,
both the district courts and the courts of appeals concluded that com-
puter bank terminals constituted branches and were, therefore, governed
by state branching limitations.92
Electronic funds terminals may be analogized in function to the sup-
plementary services provided by branches to the home office.93  This
functional approach tends to force an equation of terminal services with
branching activities. Until comparative studies indicate significant dif-
ferences between the effects of conventional branching and those of off-
premise computer delivery systems, the courts can be expected to utilize
this analogy. 94 Moreover, the potential anticompetitive effects of com-
puter bank terminals cannot be ignored.95
C. A Competition in Laxity
The foregoing analysis indicated several problems in the field of bank
supervision and regulation. Statutory inequalities persist among bank
classes and national banks, through the incidental powers clause, 96
enjoy extensive powers unmatched by their state counterparts. 9 The
25 CATH. L. REv. 739 (1976); Murray, EFTS and Antitrust - Some Reflections on the
Possibilities, 37 U. Prrr. L. REV. 673 (1976).
"' Colorado ex rel. State Banking Bd. v. First Nat'l Bank, 394 F. Supp. 979 (W.D.
Colo. 1975), modified, 540 F.2d 479 (10th Cir. 1976) (district court held than an elec-
tronic terminal is a branch only to the extent that it conflicts with state law, thus computer
systems were only branches to the extent that deposits were received; court of appeals
reversed in part holding that the use of electronic systems to withdraw and transfer funds
also constituted branch banking and offended 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1970)); accord, Missouri
ex rel. Kostman v. First Nat'l Bank, 405 F. Supp. 733 (E.D. Mo. 1975), affd, 538 F.2d 219
(8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 941 (1976); Independent Bankers Ass'n of America
v. Smith, 402 F. Supp. 207 (1975), aff'd, 534 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (customer ter-
minal constituted a branch under 12 U.S.C. § 35(f) (1970) and was subject to state branch-
ing laws; the court enjoined the Comptroller from further implementation of his ruling
that computer terminals were not branches); accord, Illinois ex rel. Lignoul v. Continental
I1l. Natl Bank & Trust Co., 409 F. Supp. 1167 (N.D. I11. 1975), afl'd, 536 F.2d 176 (7th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 871 (1976).
92 See also note 86 supra.
'3 An example of this functional equation of electronic terminals and branch ser-
vices is evident in the district court opinion of Independent Bankers Ass'n of America v.
Smith, 402 F. Supp. 207 (D.D.C. 1975).
14 In 1974, Congress established the National Commission on Electronic Transfers to
conduct a study and to recommend appropriate administrative action and legislation for
the development and regulation of public and private electronic fund transfer systems.
Pub. L. No. 93-495 § 203(a) (Oct. 28, 1974), as codified, 12 U.S.C. § 2402 (Supp. V 1975).
9- See note 90 supra. The potential anticompetitive effects of electronic funds trans-
fer systems may result from increased asset concentrations among banks which own and
lease these systems. These banks could easily control the product market in computer
services if they are permitted to restrict entry into this market. Other antitrust viola-
tions may occur if access to the facilities is limited by the controlling banks. Restrictions
on access could be obtained either by refusing to deal with potential customers or by
charging unreasonable prices for use of the facilities. See Bernard, Some'Antitrust Issues
Raised by Large Electronic Funds Transfer Systems, 25 CATH. L. REV. 749 (1976). The
increased asset size of banks with EFT systems also may permit these banks to dominate
the delivery of banking services in the geographic market in which they are located.
96 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (1970).
9' See notes 27-32 supra and accompanying text.
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statutes which enumerate bank powers also vary among the bank
classes. 98 The distribution of regulatory authority for merger approvals
contributes to inter-agency conflict at the federal level;99 branching
questions illustrate state-federal discord. 00
State branching decisions also illustrate the potential for duplica-
tion of effort inherent in a system of regulatory stratification. The
secondary approval functions of the Federal Reserve Board and the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation over branch applications of
state member banks and nonmember insured banks, serve as a hier-
archy of rubber-stamping rather than a system of checks and balances.10 '
Cost and time inefficiencies are also manifest in processing decisions
which affect more than one bank class, because such decisions are sub-
ject to scrutiny by several regulatory agencies. Such decisions also
must be discussed by the Interagency Coordinating Committee on Bank
Regulation, comprised of representatives from the FDIC, the Federal
Reserve Board, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, and the Office of
the Comptroller. 10 2  While attempts at coordination may appear pro-
ductive in theory, in practice these attempts have proved time-consum-
ing and often fail to achieve uniform results.10 3
Banking, like other regulated industries, tends "to probe for the soft
underside of the regulatory body.' 1 4 Under the present regulatory sys-
tem, the "soft underside" is often readily apparent. For example, the
Office of the Comptroller is predictable in its support of bank expan-
sion; 0 5 therefore, a large state bank which desires to move into the non-
bank service area may convert to national charter, particularly if the state
law of its chartering jurisdiction is restrictive. Similar regulation-shop-
ping occurs at the federal level. A state member bank may decide
that the federal reserve requirements impound too large a percentage
of its assets, and withdraw from the Federal Reserve System. Regula-
tory agencies, keenly aware of this "regulation-shopping", may compro-
mise their regulatory policies in order to maintain membership of the
banks within their jurisdictions.10 6
This pattern of deregulation has been termed by banking commenta-
tors a "competition in laxity." It is encouraged by the current system
of financial support of federal bank supervision. The expenses of the
Comptroller are borne by supervised national banks through a dual as-
9 See, e.g., notes 20-26 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 47-57 supra and accompanying text.
10 Some of this discord has been minimized by the Supreme Court decisions which
subject national banks to state branching restrictions. See note 86 supra. See also
notes 83-95 supra and accompanying text.
101 See note 73 supra and accompanying text.
102 Naegele, A Paper Dealing with Standby Letters of Credit and Other Bank Guar-
anties, in COMPENDIUM, supra note 35, at 665.
10 id.
104 1975 Hearings on S. 2298, supra note 10, at 67 (statement of J. L. Robertson).
105 See notes 29-32 .supra and accompanying text.
'06 See also 1975 Hearings on S. 2298, supra note 10, at 67 (testimony of J. L. Robert-
son), partially attributing the recent bank failures to the institutionalized laxity among
the federal regulators.
19761
17Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1976
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
sessment - a flat fee per bank and a percentage of bank assets. 0 7 The
expenses of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation are also satis-
fied through direct assessment income; the operating costs of the Fed-
eral Reserve System are paid through Federal Reserve funds, which
constitute an indirect assessment on supervised banks. 10 8 '
Under this system, it is natural for federal regulators to succumb to
pressures exerted by banking interests since their operating budgets
depend on control over a substantial number of banks. The pressures
from banking interests may be direct, through lobbying, or indirect, as
exemplified by withdrawals from the Federal Reserve System.1°9 This
financial dependence of the federal regulatory agencies on the regu-
lated banks should be suspect because public and private interests in
industry regulation do not always coincide.110
With these problems in mind, the Federal Bank Commission Act'
was proposed as an attempt to eliminate the difficulties inherent in a
system of stratified federal bank regulation. An examination of this
bill, which advocates consolidation of the three federal regulators into
a single commission, is necessary for an understanding of banking re-
form at the federal level.
II. FEDERAL BANK COMMISSION Acr
A. Legislative History
Consolidation of federal bank supervision into a single agency was
proposed as early as 1919,112 only six years after the division of federal
bank regulation between the Office of the Comptroller and the Federal
Reserve Board.1 1 3  Since that time, it has been the focus of numerous
advisory reports: the Brookings Institution in 1937,114 the Hoover Com-
'- 12 U.S.C. §§ 481-82 (1970). See also Staff Analysis of Subcomm. on Bank Super-
vision and Insurance, in Hearings on Proposed Federal Banking Comm'n and Federal
Deposit & Sav. Insur. Bd. Before the Subcomm. on Bank Supervision and Ins. of the
House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 63 (1965) [hereinafter
cited as 1965 Hearings).
'- 12 U.S.C. § 1817 (1970) (FDIC assessments); 12 U.S.C. § 243 (1970) (Federal
Reserve funding).
109 See Remarks of J. L. Robertson Before the 72d Annual Convention of the Ten-
nessee Bankers Ass'n (May 16, 1972), reprinted in 1975 Hearings on S. 2298, supra note 10,
at 27.
110 Some private industrial interests, such as the desire to obtain monopoly profits or to
secure protection against rigorous competition, may induce price-fixing schemes or re-
ciprocal dealing arrangements which demand public intervention. The potential for
governmental sanctions of these practices becomes acute in the regulated industries,
particularly in those industries in which the regulator depends on the firms for financial
support. D. PECRUM, PUBLIC REGULATION OF BUSINEss 39 (1965).
"I S. 684, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CoNG. REc. S2469 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 1977).
11 S. 1370, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. (1919); H.R. 15983, 65th Cong., 3d Sess. (1919).
"1 See generally Hackley, Our Baffling Banking System - Part II, 52 VA. L. REV.
771, 800 (1966).
114 The Brookings Report recommended that nearly all regulatory authority be vested in
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. The Federal Reserve Board would retain veto
power over the FDIC's approval of national charters and would participate in a commit-
tee of five, charged with fixing maximum interest rates on deposits. All other authority
would rest with the FDIC. The Comptroller's office would be abolished. S. REP. No. 1275,
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mission in 1939,115 the Commission on Money and Credit in 1961,116
and the Hunt Commission in 1971.1'
The Federal Bank Commission Act, l l ' the consolidation proposal
pending before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs, was originally proposed by James L. Robertson, former Gover-
nor of the Federal Reserve Board, in an address before the Tennessee
Bankers Association in May 1962.119 It has been the subject of two
bills before the House of Representatives 120 and the topic of congres-
sional hearings in 1963121 and 1965.122 A third set of hearings was
conducted in 1 975 .123 Hearings on the pending Senate legislation
have not yet been scheduled.
Former Governor Robertson's proposal is distinguishable from pre-
vious consolidation schemes in its suggestion to establish a new govern-
75th Cong., 1st Sess. 222-23 (1937). The report was to be used by the Senate Select
Committee to Investigate Executive Agencies of the Government with a View to Coordina-
tion.
115 The Hoover Commission urged that a task force be established to study banking
agencies. It also suggested the transfer of the FDIC to the Department of the Treasury
and the consolidation of all supervisory powers within a single federal agency, prefer-
ably the Federal Reserve Board. U.S. COMM'N ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUrIvE
BRANCI OF THE GOV'T, REPORT ON INDEPENDENT REGULATORY CoMM'Ns 11-12 (1949).
"' The 1961 Report of the Commission on Money and Credit resembled the Hoover
Commission Report in its recommendation that the sole authority for federal bank super-
vision should exist within the Federal Reserve Board. COMM'N ON MONEY AND CREDIT,
THEIR INFLUENCE ON JOBS, PRICES AND GROwrl 174 (1961).
117 The Hunt Commission Study advocated stripping the FDIC and the Federal Re-
serve of all regulatory powers and urged instead the establishment of a new Federal Ad-
ministrator of State Banks and of a single Federal Deposit Guarantee Association.
Under this plan, the Administrator would supervise all state-chartered banks at the federal
level; the Association would take charge of deposit insurance and related functions; and
the Office of the Comptroller would remain intact. The study further advocated "removal
of regulatory barriers" in order to enhance banking competition. Most notably, it was
suggested that savings and loan associations be allowed to perform banking functions
and that prohibitive state branching laws should be suspended. REPORT OF THE PRESI-
DENT'S COMM'N ON FINANCIAL SRUcTRtmE AND REGULATION (1971).
S S. 684, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. S2469 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 1977).
119 The original proposal was essentially the same as the pending bill, however, the
initial proposal was more specific. It suggested that the Federal Bank Commission con-
sist of two separate arms, each headed by a single administrator: a Director of Insurance
would handle the deposit insurance functions presently performed by the FDIC; and a
Director of Bank Examinations would adminster all bank examination and supervisory
functions. The Director of Examinations would also be required to submit to the Bank
Commission reports and recommendations with respect to every charter, branch, merger,
and holding company application as well as reports of any instance in which an insured
bank engaged in unsound practices or violations of the law. 1975 Hearings on S. 2298,
supra note 10, at 24-25 (statement of J. L. Robertson). The bill now pending before the
Senate Committee eliminates this two-unit approach; instead it would afford the Com-
mission broad delegatory powers. S. 684, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7(a), (b), 123 CONG.
REC. S2472 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 1977).
120 H.R. 5874, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); H.R. 107, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
'21 Hearings on the Conflict of Federal and State Banking Laws Before the House
Comm. on Banking and Currency, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963) [hereinafter cited as
1963 Hearings].
122 1965 Hearings, supra note 107. Neither the 1963 nor 1965 versions of the bill
were ever reported out of the House Committee on Banking and Currency, and, there-
fore, no committee reports are available.
'23 1975 Hearings on S. 2298, supra note 10.
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mental agency, the Federal Bank Commission, to administer bank regula-
tory functions at the federal level. The prior proposals appealed for
unification within one of the existing regulatory agencies or within the
Treasury Department. 24  Subsequent to the widespread dissemination
of Robertson's proposal, three alternative consolidations were suggested,
each of which vested some administration within a newly-created agen-
cy. 125  These alternatives, however, are responses to the Federal Bank
Commission Act rather than proposals in their own right. They focus
upon coordination and compromise between existing federal agencies
rather than upon true consolidation, which necessarily entails transfer
of existing agency functions into a single regulatory body. Since they
present the main arguments against adoption of the Federal Bank Com-
mission Act, each of these proposals will be discussed below. Before
examination of these alternatives, however, the Act itself should be out-
lined.
B. Description of the Act
The Federal Bank Commission Act is premised upon three congres-
sional findings: that the existing federal regulatory structure is inca-
pable of insuring safe and sound commercial banking; that a sound bank-
ing environment is crucial to a stable economy; and that the Federal
Reserve System can best fulfill its primary responsibility to conduct
national morletary policy if it is relieved from its banking supervisory
functions.126  These three findings correspond to the Act's expressed
policies of advocating consolidation to effectuate impartial and uniform
application of the federal banking laws; preserving and strengthening
the dual banking system; and enabling the Federal Reserve Board to
concentrate solely upon the development and implementation of mone-
tary policy.127
The Act proposes to foster these policies by the transfer of all exam-
ination functions performed by the existing federal agencies to the Fed-
eral Bank Commission, and by the elimination of the Office of the Comp-
124 COMM'N ON MONEY AND CREDIT, THEIR INFLUENCE ON JOBS, PRICES, AND CROwTH
174 (1961) (sole federal bank regulation in Federal Reserve Board); U.S. COMM'N ON
ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVT, REP. ON INrEPENDENT REGULA-
TORY COMM'NS 11-12 (1949) (transfer of FDIC powers to the Treasury Department and
consolidation of all federal bank regulatory authority, preferably in Federal Reserve
Board); S. REP. No. 1275, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 222-23 (1937) (vest most regulatory
power in FDIC). See generally Remarks of J. M. Bucher, Member Board of Governors,
Federal Reserve System, to the Annual Convention of the Western Independent Bankers
Ass'n (March 11, 1975), reprinted in COMPENDIUM, supra note 35, at 876.
125 Statement by R. C. Holland, Member Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, Before Subcomm. on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insur-
ance of the House Comm. on Banking, Currency and Housing 15-19 (Dec. 17, 1975) (on
file in the offices of the Cleveland State Law Review); 1975 Hearings on S. 2298, supra
note 10, at 266-72 (statement of Frank Wille, Chairman, FDIC) (Federal Banking Board
proposal).
126 S. 684, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a)(1)-(3), 123 CONG. BEC. S2471 (daily ed.
Feb. 10, 1977).
12 Id. § 2(b)(1)-(3).
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troller and of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.' 28 Stripped
of its supervisory functions, the Federal Reserve Board would be free
to concentrate solely upon development of national monetary policy.
2 9
Moreover, the Act contemplates federal deregulation of state-chartered
banks. The Commission could remove itself from state insured bank
supervision when satisfied that the state banking authorities would be
competent to accept full responsibility for state bank regulation.
30
According to the proposed Act, the Federal Bank Commission would
consist of a five-person board, selected on a non-partisan basis to serve
for staggered five-year terms. Four of the Commissioners would be
appointed by the President and be subject to approval by the Senate;
the fifth would be designated by the Chairperson of the Board of Gover-
nors of the Federal Reserve Board from among members of the Board.
131
The Commission would assume exclusive jurisdiction over all areas pres-
ently under the control of the three federal banking agencies. Specif-
ically, branch, charter, and merger questions, and those concerning bank
holding companies and fiduciary and foreign banking activities would
be subject to the Commission's interpretation. 32 The new agency
also would be authorized to promulgate regulations in all banking areas
except monetary policy.'3 Functions related to policy interpretation or
implementation could be delegated by the five-person board; however,
the promulgation of regulations and the formulation of general policy
would rest exclusively with the board itself.1 4
In addition to its policy and rule-making functions the Commission
would also review, either upon its own motion or upon that of others,
actions taken by its subordinates. Review could be obtained by any
institution which is terminated or against which a cease and desist
order has been issued. Also, any person adversely affected by a ruling
of the Commission could apply for a review of that action.13 5
121 Id. § 5(c) (transferring all Comptroller functions to the Federal Bank Commission
but for the currency and redemption duties transferred to the Secretary of the Treasury),
and id. § 5(d) (transferring all FDIC functions to the Bank Commission).
I- Id. § 2(3).
130 Id. § 312(d), amending 12 U.S.C. § 326 (1970). Removal would be discretionary
with the Commission; no statutory standards are set. Former Governor J. L. Robertson
advocates revision of S. 2298 to include a provision contained in the 1963 and 1965 ver-
sions of the bill. This provision would defray all costs of federal bank supervision from
deposit insurance assessments and would provide state insured banks with a refund of the
insurance amount assessed by state regulators. Mr. Robertson argued that such assess-
ment and refund to state insured banks would put state and national banks on a financial
parity and would encourage state banking authorities to accept total supervisory respon-
sibility for state banks. 1975 Hearings on S. 2298, supra note 10, at 67 (testimony of
J. L. Robertson). For the comparable provision in the 1965 version of the Federal Bank
Commission Act, see H.R. 107, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. § 11 (1965). See also notes 201-02
infra and accompanying text.
131 S. 684, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3, 123 CONG. REC. S2471 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 1977).
132 Id. §. 5.
'3 Id. By reason of section 2(3) of the Act, all monetary policy regulation rests in
the Federal Reserve Board.
131 Id. § 7(b), (d).
1,5 Id. § 7(c).
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C. Impact of the Act on the Present Regulatory Scheme
While consolidation of the three federal banking agencies will not,
of itself, resolve all the problems of the current regulatory structure,
its potential benefits should not be overlooked. Not only would unifica-
tion of federr-I bank supervision reduce costs and increase efficiencies
through the elimination of wasteful duplication of effort, but it would
also promote consistency in decision-making. All branch, charter, and
merger applications would be scrutinized by a single agency instead of
three, and banking decisions would be made according to a single set of
rules. 136  Moreover, consolidation, if accompanied by substantive
changes in federal banking statutes, should diminish the laxity associ-
ated with federal inter-agency conflict and should remove the present im-
petus for regulation-shopping at the federal level. 137
Opponents of the Federal Bank Commission Act, by contrast, ad-
vance the following arguments against consolidation: the existing regu-
latory scheme has worked well in the past; centralized regulation and
the attendant concentration of power in a single agency would eliminate
competition between agencies and the innovation in the banking industry
attributable to such competition; 13 and consolidation would impair, if
not destroy, the dual banking system. 39 The first argument may be
dismissed as the most tenuous. The inadequacies of the current fed-
eral regulation have already been indicated, and they imply a need for
regulatory reform. 140  The other two arguments should be more- care-
fully examined, however, since they address the economic effects of con-
solidation as a means to reform bank regulation.
136 Although the rules governing banking activities should be applied in an impartial
and consistent manner, they need not be singular in focus. The Federal Bank Commis-
sion could adopt varied standards by which a particular banking activity could be regu-
lated. For example, a branch application could be approved or disapproved, depending
on factors such as the size and capital adequacy of the home office and the projected ef-
fects of the branch on bank competition in the surrounding area. Such varied guidelines
would promote flexibility in branch approvals; the single-agency regulator would foster
consistent decision-making in each case.
13' There is a possibility, however, that under one agency regulation-shopping will re-
main under the guise of federal to state charter conversions. Conceivably, states may
enact legislation rendering federal chartering less desirable than state incorporation and
regulation. States could then compete to attract banks to their jurisdictions in much the
same way that the state of Delaware attracts corporations that wish to take advantage of
that state's liberal corporation and tax laws.
13 See, e.g., Statement of J. E. Smith, Comptroller of the Currency, before the Sub-
committee on Financial Institutions, Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of the House
Banking Committee 3-4 (July 17, 1975) (on file in the offices of the Cleveland State Law
Review).
139 Traditionally, this argument has dominated the debate over federal agency consoli-
dation proposals and is most often advanced by state bankers and state banking authori-
ties, who are concerned with protecting their geographic domains. See, e.g., 1963 Hear-
ings, supra note 121, at 329 (statement of Randolph Hughes, Chairman of the Legislative
Comm. of the National Ass'n of Supervisors of State Banks (NASSB)); see also 1965
Hearings, supra note 107, at 122-23 (statement of F. S. Cullom, Chairman of the Legis-
lative Comm., NASSB). See generally Hackley, Our Baffling Banking System - Part II,
52 VA. L. REV. 771, 817 (1966).
140 A further example is the inadequacy of the accounting practices presently em-
ployed by regulatory agencies in bank examinations. The practices "insulate the bal-
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A serious objection to regulatory consolidation is that it would pro-
mote an unhealthy concentration of power within a single federal regu-
latory agency. The-premise of this argument is that the strength of
diffuse regulation is its encouragement of experimentation through the
creation of separate laboratories with which to test new regulatory ap-
proaches. For example, proponents of this argument might note that only
the Comptroller of the Currency adopted a policy which would encourage
bank expansion into traditionally nonbank service industries, such as
travel accommodations and data processing equipment. 4 ' The other
federal banking agencies have not adopted similar policies. There-
fore, it may be argued, the Comptroller has provided a testing ground
to determine the scope of permissible bank expansion into traditionally
nonbank service areas.
Those who oppose the Federal Bank Commission Act contend that
the benefits of inter-agency competition would be lost if the federal
agencies were consolidated.142  While single-agency regulation, in
theory, could impede regulatory experimentation, this detriment may be
outweighed by the public savings to be attained through single-agency
regulation in terms of consistent regulatory standards and reduced costs
of regulation. Diffusion of federal banking authority, moreover, may
actually impair the ability of three federal regulators to accommodate
changes within the banking industry. In general, a regulatory agency is
created to supervise industry and to advise the legislature regarding the
definition of regulatory objectives and policy. The agency is viewed as
an expert in its area of activity. Ostensibly, diffusion of supervisory
authority narrows the areas of responsibility, policy focus, and expertise
of each participating agency. For example, the Federal Reserve Board
could overstate the significance of the banking system as a conduit for
monetary policy, while the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation could
become preoccupied with the integrity of the federal deposit insurance
fund.143 Under present federal regulation, no one expert or agency
determines the overall economic purpose and public policy for bank
regulation.
As indicated, the competition among the federal banking agencies is
more accurately described as a "competition in laxity" rather than
innovative competition. Two factors contribute to this condition: the
lack of inter-agency policy coordination, as described above, and the fact
that two of the three federal banking agencies, the Office of the Comp-
ance sheet from the effects of economic instability and thereby obscure problems the regu-
lators presumably are concerned with detecting." These inadequacies include improper
valuation of loans and deposits, and omitting from consideration the bank's lines of
credit and the rollover agreements. 1975 Hearings on S. 2298, supra note 10, at 93 (state-
ment of Stuart I. Greenbaum, Professor of Economics at the University of Kentucky).
A number of large banks have recently reported significant security losses from incor-
rect agency predictions of interest rates. Kaufman, Preventing Bank Failures, in COM-
PENDIUM, supra note 35, at 792; see also Greenbaum, Economic Instability and Com-
mercial Banking, 1975 Hearings on S. 2298, supra note 10, at 305-06.
141 See notes 29-33 supra and accompanying text.
142 See notes 35-36 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the effect of the
expansion of nonbank services on banking competition.
" 1975 Hearings on S. 2298, supra note 10, at 95 (statement of Stuart I. Greenbaum).
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troller of the Currency and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,
are funded by the banks they regulate.'" Two earlier versions of the
Federal Bank Commission Act would have congressionally funded the
Commission. It is strongly urged that a similar provision be incorporated
into the present draft of the Act. 14 5 Such direct legislative accounta-
bility would promote objectivity in bank examination and lessen the risks
caused by the regulatory agencies' attempts to build a power base among
the banking community in order to sustain sufficient operating funds
It is further suggested that legislative accountability could be managed
more efficiently through single-agency regulation. A centralized in-
formation base for regulatory policy could respond more efficiently to
legislative inquiries than can three distinct regulatory bases.1 46
Opponents of the Federal Bank Commission Act also fear that single-
agency federal regulation would decrease competition in the commercial
banking industry. Competition among banks is maximized when each
bank's market share is small and when the number of banks doing
business in a given geographic area is large.147 The commercial banking
industry, however, may be characterized as an "admixture of
monopoly and competition."' 48  For example, the deposit submarket of
commercial banking industry is moderately concentrated when measured
by absolute concentration ratios, but the commercial banking industry,
as a distinct primary service product market, is comprised of a large num-
ber of banking institutions. In other words, relatively few commercial
banks control a large share of the total bank deposits. Accordingly,
competition in commercial banking services coexists with oligopolistic
control over deposit transactions.
In 1972, of the almost 14,000 independent banks in the United States,
the sixteen largest banks held one-third of all the commercial bank de-
posits in the nation, and the 168 largest commercial banks, ap-
proximately one and one-half percent of the total, held 49 percent of all
such deposits. 49  These figures suggest that a small percentage of all
commercial banks dominate that banking market. It has been argued
that, given this concentrated market structure, a single federal regulator
would further entrench the deposit concentrations of these dominant
banks. This contention presumes that the single agency would adopt a
144 See notes 107-08 supra and accompanying text.
145 See 1975 Hearings on S. 2298, supra note 10, at 67 (statement of J. L. Robertson).
146 Data and information sources are generally guarded by the regulated firm. It is in
banking management's interests, at least in the short run, to volunteer no information
and to resist agency extensions of data-gathering since any information turned over to the
agency could be introduced against the bank in future hearings. Trebing, A Critique of
Regulatory Accommodation to Change, in REGULATION IN FURTHER PERSPECrIVE 56 (W.
Shepherd & T. Gies ed. 1974). The difficulties in obtaining such data are compounded
when three regulators compete for data.
"I See generally Excerpts from Report of the White House Task Force on Antitrust
Policy (Neal Committee, 1968), reprinted in 2 ANrcrusT LAW & EcoN. REV. 22-30 (1968).
148 Trebing, A Critique of Regulatory Accommodation to Change, in REGULATON IN
FURTHER PERSPECrVE 64 n.40 (W. Shepherd & T. Gies ed. 1974).
149 The following table indicates that, at the end of 1972, 79 percent of the commercial
banks in the United States held only 16 percent of the aggregate deposits in the banking
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passive approach to regulation affording banking management control
over changes in reserve requirements, interest rates, the introduction
and abandonment of services, and new directions for research and mar-
keting.
The above argument generally is correct in its assessment of the
anticompetitive effects of passive governmental regulation on concen-
trated markets. As indicated, the federal banking agencies have
adopted a passive approach to regulation through their "competition
in laxity."' 5° The argument emphasizes that antitrust problems would
recur if the Federal Bank Commission followed this approach. Banking
competition may decline with a single federal regulator, since it is easier
for a regulated industry to capture one agency than to control three.
An entrenched market structure, coupled with regulatory acquiescence,
provides dominant firms with the potential to dictate the rate of industry
innovation, rather than allowing the rate to be market-determined.
1 5
'
While too little regulation can be a sham and function to legitimize
monopoly gains within an industry, overreaching regulation may prove
deleterious to competition by unduly restricting entry into regulated
markets. How to balance the need for competition against that for
industry regulation, to the extent that regulation carves out legally
protected market shares, 5 2 is a question which is far from settled.
An examination of single federal administrative agencies sheds little
system. The 168 largest banks, one and one-half percent of all banks, held 49 percent
of all deposits. These figures include demand, time, and savings deposit totals.
Size Distribution of Insured Commercial Banks
(1972)
% of Total % of Total
Deposit Size No. of Banks Banks Deposits
Less than $5 million 3,283 24% 2%
$5-25 million 7,397 54 14
$25-50 million 1,610 12 9
$50-100 million 741 5 8
$100-500 million 534 4 18
$500 million-1 billion 96 1 11
$1-5 billion 56 0.4 5
Over $5 billion 16 0.1 33
TOTALS 13,733 100% 100%
FDIC Annual Report and The American Banker, reprinted in L. RITTER & W. SILBER,
PRINCIPLES OF MONEY, BANKING, AND FINANCIAL MARKETs 378 (1974).
's0 See notes 96-111 supra and accompanying text.
"I Trebing, A Critique of Regulatory Accommodation to Change, in REGULATION IN
FURTHER PERSPECrIVE 59 (W. Sheperd & T. Gies ed. 1974).
152 For example, to the extent that governmental regulation creates unnatural barriers
to market entry in a regulated industry, the market shares of existing firms become
legally protected. Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities?, in REGULATION IN FURTHER PER-
SPECTiVE, id. at 135. In the banking industry, governmental regulation is less pervasive
than in the public utility area, however, the rate of entry is nevertheless restricted
by regulation. Branching limitations, minimum capital requirements, and reserve require-
ments constitute the primary regulatory barriers to entry. One commentator concluded
that in recent decades such restrictions have reduced the rate of bank entry by 33-55 per-
cent from freely competitive levels. Peltzman, Biank Entry Regulation: Its Impact a(id
Purpose, cited in L. RIT-ER & W. SILBER, PRINCIPLES OF MO'EY, BANKING, AND FINANCIAL
MARKETS 382 n.7 (1974).
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light on this question, since the agencies tend to protect the competitors
in the regulated industry rather than to protect competition. 53  This
practice illustrates the tension between regulation and antitrust policy.
The federal antitrust laws are designed to protect industry competition,
not individual competitors. 5 4 Should the Federal Bank Commission fol-
low the practices of other single regulatory agencies, banking competi-
tion probably would be reduced. To the extent that market competition
is better for the banking industry than is regulation,' those who oppose
the Federal Bank Commission Act based upon the fact that consolida-
tion may reduce banking competition, would appear to have a valid
argument. At least some degree of regulation is necessary to insure
safe banking. Evidence indicates that the rate of bank failures increases
as market forces predominate over regulation.'-5 Thus, in this regard,
the evidence weighs in favor of regulation at the expense of some com-
petition in banking markets;157 whereas, in areas such as merger ap-
provals, competitive factors would seem to be the overriding considera-
tion.
A final argument against consolidation is that it would destroy the
dual banking system, which offers banks the option of selecting state or
federal charters.'- Equating consolidation with greater federal con-
trol over state banks, proponents of this view contend that state banking
authorities would become overpowered by a single-agency federal regu-
lator.159  For example, they fear that the Bank Commission would in-
herit the combined budgets of the existing federal agencies and,
therefore, that state authorities would be unable to compete with agency
innovation at the federal level. 60 Consolidation does not, by itself,
dictate expanded federal control over the banking industry. In fact, a
provision of the Federal Bank Commission Act contemplates suspension
of federal examinations of state member banks once state authorities
demonstrate to the Bank Commission that they can adequately super-
1 Manus, Competition in Regulated Industries - Economics, in COMPETITION IN
REGULATED INDUSTRIES: ESSAYS ON ECONOMIC ISSUES 29-35 (J. Niss & M. Pledge ed.
1975).
'5 E. SINGER, ANTITRUST ECONOMICS: SELECTED LEGAL CASES AND ECONOMIC MODELS
40-41 (1968).
'5 The extent to which the banking industry should be regulated has been a subject of
increased debate in recent years. See Benston, The Optimal Banking Structure: Theory
and Evidence, in CUaENT PERSPECTIVES IN BANKING: OPERATIONS, MANAGEMENT, AND
REGULATION 365 (T. Havrilesky & J. Boorman ed. 1976).
156 See generally Guttentag, Reflections on Bank Regulatory Structure and Large
Bank Failures id. at 502.
15' One of the primary purposes of banking regulation is to safeguard bank deposits
for the public. Arguably, reliance on market competition should govern in commercial
banking markets only so long as it serves this end. See notes 219-23 infra and accom-
panying text.
,5 See generally Redford, Dual Banking: A Case Study in Federalism, 31 LAW &
CoNTEMP. PROB. 749 (1966), for a good introduction to the subject of dual banking.
,59 See notes 187-92 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of dual banking.
160 Most state banking agencies are now unable to compete with the three federal reg-
ulators because of insufficient state appropriations for regulation. As a result, state
agencies tend to mirror federal innovation in banking regulation.
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vise those banks within their jurisdictions.16 1 This provision actually
would expand the examination functions of state banking authorities
and, thus, arguably strengthen the dual banking system.
D. Alternative Proposals for Centralization
The diffusion of authority among the three federal banking agencies
undermines the legislative accountability of all three agencies. The
existence of multiple regulatory agencies, as well as fifty state agencies,
enables federal and state regulators to shift the blame among them-
selves for errors in judgment, unsound policies, and negligence.1 62  Re-
cent bank failures have made legislators increasingly aware of the need
for uniform regulation and has prompted consideration of consolidation
of the three agencies as a viable means of reinstating legislative account-
ability at the federal level.
The congressional support for consolidation is evident in the juris-
dictional provisions of recent banking legislation. This legislation gen-
erally designates a single agency to promulgate substantive regulations
and requires the three federal banking agencies to enforce such regula-
tions with respect to the banks which they examine. An example of
this trend towards centralized regulation is the Bank Holding Company
Act of 1956, as amended in 1970.63 Under this Act, the Federal Re-
serve Board retains exclusive jurisdiction over both multi-bank and one-
bank holding companies, irrespective of the bank's bank class.' °
The federal banking agencies are aware of this growing congressional
preference for centralization but oppose the Federal Bank Commission
Act because it would dissolve the existing agencies. In attempting to
161 S. 684, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 312(d), 123 CONG. REc. S2478 (daily ed. Feb. 10,
1977).
162 Address by Frank Wille, Chairman, FDIC, Before the Fall Meeting of the Ass'n of
Registered Bank Holding Companies 3 (Nov. 17, 1975) (on file in the offices of the
Cleveland State Law Review).
'- 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-49 (1970). For an overview of the legislative history of the 1970
amendments, see S. REP. No. 91-1084, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1954] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5519.
164 The Federal Reserve Board maintains exclusive primary jurisdiction over the ap-
proval of all bank acquisitions by bank holding companies. 12 U.S.C. § 1842 (1970).
The Board must immediately notify the Attorney General of any approvals, pursuant to
12 U.S.C. § 1842 (Supp. IV 1974), so that the Justice Department can determine whether
to institute antitrust proceedings against the acquisition under 12 U.S.C. § 1849 (Supp. IV
1974).
The 1956 Bank Holding Company Act defined a bank holding company as any corpo-
ration or other business association which controlled two or more banks, 12 U.S.C. § 1841
(1970). One-bank holding companies were, therefore, excluded from this earlier defi-
nition but were brought within the purview of the statute by the 1970 amendments to the
Bank Holding Company Act. One-bank holding companies control the single lead bank as
well as other nonbanking interests. This nonbanking expansion has caused bank holding
companies to increasingly rely on non-price competition; a similar reliance on non-price
competition has resulted from national bank expansion into nonbank service industries.
Antitrust regulation becomes complicated by this non-price dimension. The Bank Hold-
ing Company Act does not exempt from the antitrust laws any holding company activities
which are anticompetitive or monopolistic. United States v. Philadelphia Natl Bank, 374
U.S. 321 (1963). See generaly Pierson, Bank. Holding Company Capital, in COMPENDlUM,
supra note 35, at 434.
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reconcile these competing concerns, representatives from the Federal
Reserve Board and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation have
suggested alternative proposals to the Federal Bank Commission Act.1
6 5
Two reform proposals have gained strong support within the Federal
Reserve Board; neither has obtained majority approval by the Board. 16
The first sanctions consolidation of the Comptroller's functions within
the Federal Reserve System;' s7 the second advocates the creation of a
Federal Bank Examination Council either administratively or legislatively
established.16 8  The Council would be authorized to set standards and
procedures for all three federal agencies and would review significant
problem cases. Representatives from the three regulatory agencies
would sit on the Council. 169
Both Federal Reserve proposals illustrate the agency's reluctance to
abdicate its bank supervisory functions. The Federal Reserve Board
has consistently emphasized the close relationship between the formula-
tion of monetary policy and bank regulation 170 and thus opposes' 7 1 the
165 For a general discussion of the Federal Reserve proposals see 1975 Hearings on S.
2298, supra note 10, at 280-85 (statement of Robert C. Holland, Member, Board of Gov-
ernors of the Federal Reserve System); the proposal recommended by Frank Wille, Chair-
man of the FDIC, also appears in the Hearings, id. at 272-80.
166 Id. at 285.
167 Consolidation within the Federal Reserve Board emerges as the most often sug-
gested proposal for bank regulatory centralization. The present rationale for this pro-
posal is that all natiojial banks are required to be members of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem and are subject to the Board's regulation, the Board has primary responsibility for
all bank holding companies, and many of the major bank subsidiaries of such holding
companies are national banks; therefore, consolidation of national bank supervision within
the Federal Reserve Board would increase efficiencies "without some of the dangers of
complete unification." 1975 Hearings on S. 2298, supra note 10, at 284 (statement of
Governor Holland).
168 Id.
169 Id. This Federal Reserve proposal was withdrawn from consideration by the Sen-
ate Banking Committee before the close of the 94th Congress. The Committee's leader-
ship withdrew the proposal after the Committee narrowly voted to block further consid-
eration of two related bills, H.R. 12834 - a bill to restructure the Federal Reserve System,
and H.R. 3035 - a measure to permit interest payments on public funds deposited in
demand accounts in commercial banks. The three bills were originally components of a
legislative "package" proposed to institute changes in the Federal Reserve System and in
the regulation of foreign banks and thrift institutions. In March 1976, that package was
split into three proposals in response to formidable opposition to the plan by a wide variety
of groups, including the American Bankers Association, the AFL-CIO, and the Ford ad-
ministration. The withdrawal of the Federal Bank Examination Council scheme may,
therefore, be viewed as a "saving" tactic by Senator William Proxmire, Chairperson of
the Senate Banking Committee, in an effort to allow discussion of this proposal in conjunc-
tion with that of the Federal Bank Commission Act upon its early revival in the 95th Con-
gress. See generally 34 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 2622 (1976).
170 (T]he role of the Federal Reserve as monetary policy-maker and as lender
of last resort interacts more sensitively than ever before with the effects of pre-
vailing bank supervisory and regulatory policies. Each of these areas of public
policy increasingly influences the effectiveness of the other. The Board's policy
is based on the conviction that to divorce them is to weaken both.
Bo. OF GOV. OF THE FED. RESERVE SYSTEM, 62D ANN. REP. 262-63 (1975). But see Re-
marks of J. M. Bucher, Member Board of Governors Federal Reserve System, to the An-
nual Convention of the Western Independent Bankers Ass'n, (March 11, 1975), reprinted
in COMPENDIUM, supra note 35, at 887-88. Mr. Bucher contends that when the same
agency that has the responsibility for setting national monetary policy plays a major role
in bank regulation, conflicting objectives may arise, based on these separate agency re-
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Federal Bank Commission Act plan to strip the Federal Reserve of all
bank supervisory powers.1
72
Although more far-reaching than the Federal Reserve proposals, the
reorganization plan initiated by Frank Wille of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation also stops short of a total consolidation of the
regulatory agencies. This proposal entails the centralization of the
supervisory duties presently performed by the Federal Reserve Board
and the FDIC into a new agency, headed by the Federal Supervisor of
State Banks, 73 and the formation of a five-member Federal Banking
Board, with powers limited to the implementation of a national policy
for bank regulation. 174  Congress would determine which matters re-
quired national uniform regulation, and these matters would define
the scope of the Banking Board's jurisdiction. 75 The Board would con-
sist of three ex-offlcio members, one from each of the existing federal
banking agencies, and two appointed by the President and confirmed
by the Senate. 176
The Wille proposal thus contemplates the perpetuation of the three
federal regulators, although federal regulation of state-chartered insti-
tutions would be consolidated under the Federal Supervisor of State
Banks. Federal inter-agency conflict could be expected to continue be-
tween two agencies, the Federal Supervisor and the Comptroller, with
the Federal Banking Board acting as an arbitrator. The greatest down-
fall of the Banking Board scheme is its focus on crisis resolution rather
than on the use of preventive measures to promote consistent decision-
making.
Uniformity in regulation does not appear to be a result of the Wille
proposal, since the Banking Board's jurisdiction is dependent upon a
vague standard. The Board's powers would be restricted to those areas
that Congress deemed require uniform regulation. Irregularity in deci-
sponsibilities. He particularly emphasizes the need for bank examiners to be insulated
"from any possible temptation of the monetary authority to use supervisory powers to
implement monetary policy ... this exemplifies the kind of collision that could under-
cut either monetary policy or regulatory objectivity or both." Id. at 888-89. He also sup-
ports former Governor Robertson's argument against consolidation within the Federal
Reserve, since the responsibilities for developing monetary policy are so great that the
Board should not be assigned further duties in terms of bank supervisory functions. Id.
at 887-88; 1975 Hearings on S. 2298, supra note 10, at 71 (testimony of J. L. Robertson).
171 1975 Hearings on S. 2298, supra note 10, at 281 (statement of Robert Holland).
172 It is questionable whether any substantive banking reform may be effectuated
through the coordinated efforts of existing regulators. The biases and prejudices affiliated
with the present structure present a foreboding obstacle to regulatory change. Consoli-
dation within a new agency - the Federal Bank Commission - would, at least, facilitate
reform through the requisite formulation of new governing policies. Absent substantive
regulatory reforms, however, consolidation may prove as ineffective as attempts at agency
coordination.
173 See also note 117 supra.
t7, See 1975 Hearings on S. 2298, supra note 10, at 276 (statement of Frank Wille), for
a discussion of the Federal Banking Board proposal.
1-1 Mr. Wille assumed that a number of areas would be subject to the Banking
Board's jurisdiction, for instance, insurance functions, bank holding company powers, and
bank merger regulation.
176 Id.
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sion-making would persist in those areas not within the Board's juris-
diction. Further, new conflicts would arise over which issues demanded
Board jurisdiction, and, since Congress would make the determination,
the decision might not be rendered on a timely basis. Moreover, it is
highly questionable whether Congress has the ability to delineate areas
of national banking concern. Such delineation is a full-time task and
should be performed by experts who are abreast of the banking indus-
try's rapid changes. While the Federal Bank Commission Act recog-
nizes this fact, and places all regulatory questions under the jurisdiction
of a team of five experts, the Banking Board proposal does not; it
merely adds a new bureaucratic layer to an already complex regulatory
structure. 1
77
Therefore, the Federal Banking Board proposal would substantively
maintain the present regulatory scheme although, in form, it would ap-
pear to diminish inter-agency conflict. It emphasizes coordination of
issues and policies rather than of agencies. It should be noted, however,
that this proposal resembles the Bank Commission Act in its plan to
remove supervisory functions from the Federal Reserve Board.178  This
provision signifies the primary point of departure of the Banking Board
proposal from the Federal Reserve's Bank Examination Council
scheme. 7 9 The appropriations provision, however, is the strongest re-
form measure of the Federal Banking Board proposal. It would substi-
tute congressional agency funding for funding through bank assessment.
A similar appropriations provision has been contemplated by the drafters
of the Federal Bank Commission Act although it is not included in the
present form of the bill. 80 It would appear that as long as the regula-
tors are tied financially to those they regulate, banking agencies will
remain dependent upon the banks within their jurisdictions.
III. DUAL BANKING AND THE FEDERAL BANK COMMISSION Acr
A. The Dual Banking System: Its Purposes and Effects
The term "dual banking" denotes a system in which banks are per-
mitted to select between two chartering systems, one federal and one
state. Bank regulation is correspondent to the chartering jurisdiction
selected. In the broadest sense, the term signifies the arrangements
under which federal and state banking structures coexist in a compre-
hensive regulatory environment.
The dual banking system originated in 1863, when the National Cur-
rency Act established federal chartering of national banks.' At its
inception, state-chartered institutions were regulated by state banking
'"The Wille proposal, in effect, merely adds two coordinating committees to the pres-
ent federal structure: a general coordinating committee in the Federal Banking Board,
and a coordinating agency in the Federal Supervisor of State Banks, for the federal super-
vision of state-chartered institutions.
178 S. 2298, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(3), 121 CONG. REC. 15378 (1975).
179 See notes 168-69 supra and accompanying text.
IS0 See notes 144-45 supra and accompanying text.
'8s Act of Feb. 25. 1863. ch. 58. 12 Stat. 665.
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authorities and national banks were regulated by the Comptroller of the
Currency. In 1913, this regulatory system was complicated with the
passage of the Federal Reserve Act;" 2 regulation no longer was de-
termined solely by the type of bank charter selected. State banks could
become subject to federal regulation if they voluntarily elected member-
ship in the Federal Reserve System. A similar regulatory hybrid was
created in 1933, when the Federal Deposit Insurance Act'83 subjected
state insured banks to dual regulation by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation and by the state agency controlling the bank charter. As
previously indicated, the present scheme of bank classification is illogi-
cal because it developed largely in response to periods of financial
crisis rather than pursuant to an overall regulatory scheme. In a techni-
cal sense, the banking system may still be characterized on the basis
of the type of charter selected, whether federal or state. Such charac-
terization, however, fails to accurately describe the bank regulated.
A state bank which is regulated solely by its state banking authority
possesses qualities different from a state bank which is supervised by
that authority but which is also subject to regulation by the Federal
Reserve Board.8 4
It is, therefore, questionable whether any genuine federal-state duality
exists. For example, it may be argued that there are fifty-four banking
systems - those of the fifty states and the District of Columbia, the
national banking system, and two federal-state systems by reason of the
voluntary election of some state banks to join the Federal Reserve System
or to obtain federal deposit insurance. 8 5 Similarly, the banking system
may be depicted as a four-tiered structure comprised of national banks,
state member banks, state non-member insured banks, and state non-
member non-insured banks. Any of these characterizations is more ac-
curate than that of a single federal-state dichotomy and, therefore,
calls to question whether a dual banking system does, in fact, exist.
Probably the most accurate description of the system is that it is
quadruple in nature. 86 The "myth" of duality, however, has prevailed,
and its spokesmen assert that its continuance is necessary to maintain
competitive banking. 8 1 Proponents of dual banking contend that many
small banks would be unable to enter the commercial banking market if
they were required to meet the higher minimum capital requirements
for federal chartering. They, therefore, suggest that dual banking in-
creases competition in the banking industry by simultaneously increasing
the number of competitors in the commercial banking market and, cor-
respondingly decreasing the market share held by each bank. Al-
though it is conceded that dual banking may increase the number of
182 Act of Dec. 23, 1913, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251.
113 Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 168.
184 See, e.g., discussion of differing reserve requirements for state member versus
state nonmember banks, at notes 41-46 supra and accompanying text.
185 Hackley, Our Baffling Banking System - Part II, 52 VA. L. REV. 771, 815 (1966).
I8 Id. See notes 5-9 supra and accompanying text.
Ws See also notes 158-61 supra and accompanying text.
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competitors in a geographic market, it exerts little effect on banking de-
posit concentrations.18 8 Concentration ratios are not a direct measure of
competition, however, when they are examined in conjunction with ad-
ditional information, such as overall industry growth, the rates of entry
and exit of firms, and merger rates, an antitrust analysis of market power
can be obtained. 89 Banking concentrations vary widely within states,
from Kansas, where the five largest banking organizations held 13.2 per-
cent of the bank deposits in 1973, to Nevada, where the five largest
banking organizations held 97 percent of the deposits.1 90 Empirical
data indicate that branching restrictions, which limit the size of banks,
exert a more substantial check on concentrations in commercial banking
deposit submarkets than do the number of banks within the state. 9 '
"I See note 149 supra, which indicates that most commercial banks are relatively
small. Many probably could not have entered the market but for the less stringent entry
requirements for state-chartered institutions.
189 E. SINGER, ANTITRUST ECONOMICS: SELECTED LEGAL CASES AND ECONOMIC MODELS
154-55 (1968).
190 1975 Hearings on S. 2298, supra note 10, at 208 (testimony of Allen Ferguson).
"I' The table below illustrates the relationship of state branching laws and bank deposit
concentration. In states with unlimited banking (branching prohibited), deposit concentra-
tions are low because existing banks cannot increase their market share by opening new
branches. Large banks are not allowed to saturate state commercial banking markets as
they do in states which permit statewide branching. In statewide branching states, a
few large banks dominate the deposit market.
L = limited banking, S = statewide banking and U = unlimited banking (branching pro-
hibited).
State
Alabama
Alaska (S)
Arizona (S
Arkansas (
California
Colorado
Connectic
Delaware
District of
Florida (U
Georgia (I
Hawaii (S)
Idaho (S)
Illinois (U
Indiana (L
Iowa (U)
Kansas (U
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine (S)
Maryland
Massachus
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri (
Table fro
note 10, at
Percent of Deposits Held by Five Largest Banking Organizations, 1973
Percent State
L) 45.1 Montana (U)
87.9 Nebraska (U)
94.7 Nevada (S)
U) 21.0 New Hampshire (L)
(S) 75.6 New Jersey (L)
(U) 47.6 New Mexico (L)
ut (S) 61.3 New York (L)
(S) 92.0 North Carolina (S)
Columbia (S) 88.8 North Dakota (U)
31.7 Ohio (L)
47.7 Oklahoma (U)
89.2 Oregon (S)
87.9 Pennsylvania (L)
41.3 Rhode Island (S)
25.1 South Carolina (S)
18.5 South Dakota (S)
13.2 Tennessee (L)
(L) 29.7 Texas (U)
(L) 28.1 Utah (S)
69.9 Vermont (S)
(S) 61.3 Virginia (S)
etts (L) 62.9 Washington (S)
(L) 46.9 West Virginia (U)
(U) 57.4 Wisconsin (L)
(L) 33.4 Wyoming (U)
U) 32.8
m the Public Economics Center Report, in 1975 Hearings on S. 2
208.
Percent
52.8
31.8
97.0
40.1
29.3
63.6
55.4
68.1
49.8
33.3
28.7
83.1
33.4
92.7
56.1
49.3
42.1
25.3
72.0
54.9
50.7
76.2
17.5
32.9
45.0
'298, supra
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Dual banking does not affect branching, since both national and state
banks are subject to the same state branching limitations within a given
geographic area.
192
A second related argument, made by those who favor the dual bank-
ing system, is that the system fosters a healthy competition between
state and federal banking agencies. They contend that this competi-
tion, in turn, encourages innovation in banking regulation. It has al-
ready been demonstrated that the mere existence of multiple regula-
tory agencies does not promote beneficial inter-agency competition.
If one banking agency adopts a posture of regulatory laxity, a domino
effect may occur among the other agencies, so that they can maintain
the banks then within their jurisdictions. 193
To the extent that a state may be prompted to modernize antiquated
banking laws to enable its banks to compete more favorably with na-
tional banks, federal-state agency competition facilitates bank innova-
tion. Unfortunately, this type of innovation is generally unilateral due
to the disparity in resources between state and federal agencies. State
agencies tend only to emulate federal innovation; their own capabilities
for experimentation are severely limited by restrictive state appropria-
tions.
If the dual chartering system produces only a minimal public bene-
fit, how and why does that system continue to survive? One banker
suggested that the perpetuation of dual banking is dependent on three
maxims: freedom of movement between state and national bank sys-
tems; minimized federal control over state banks; and maintenance of
competitive equality between state and national banks. 194 It would ap-
pear that the present regulatory structure encourages dual banking,
since it supports two of the three foregoing principles. Conversions
ensure freedom of movement between state and federal charters.
195
Moreover, federal control over state institutions is optional, since Fed-
eral Reserve membership is voluntary with state-chartered banks as is
membership in the Federal Deposit Insurance program. One undesir-
able aspect of the dual banking system, which may pose a threat to
its continued existence, is its failure to achieve competitive equality be-
tween state and national banks.' 96  This failure is largely attributable
to the disparate funding of federal and state agencies. Furthermore,
duality has, in fact, promoted competitive inequalities among federal
192 See note 86 supra.
193 See discussion of the "competition in laxity" among federal banking agencies at
notes 96-111 supra and accompanying text.
1 1965,Hearings, supra note 107, at 331-34 (statement of Randolph Hughes).
195 A state bank may be converted into a national bank, 12 U.S.C. § 35 (1970), or, sub-
ject to certain requirements regarding minority shareholders, a national bank may convert,
merge, or consolidate with a state bank, 12 U.S.C. § 214 (1970). While conversions per-
mit bankers to take advantage of the "soft underside" of bank regulators, they also serve
a positive function in permitting banks to discover which agency best serves their institu-
tional needs.
19I It was previously suggested that a new duality has, in fact, emerged in banking,
that of the large versus the small bank. See note 82 supra and accompanying text.
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and state banks for it has enabled banks to "regulation-shop" between
federal and state banking systems. 97
B. The Case for Strengthening the Dual Banking System
The primary attribute of the federalist system is its decentralization
of governmental power. Through the maintenance of alternative bank-
ing systems, the states have provided an avenue for innovative experi-
mentation which could counteract any stagnation resulting from uni-
form regulation at the federal level.'98 This result generally has been
obtained under the dual banking system without discouraging the devel-
opment of a national banking policy.199
State chartering proffers an additional benefit to banking competi-
tion. It increases the number of competitors in banking markets, since
state capital requirements are less stringent than the federal standards.
2 0 0
Increased competition may further the national policy of maximizing
banking services while minimizing the costs of service.20 1  A further
argument advanced by proponents of a dual banking system is that it
provides an alternative forum for the supervision and protection of es-
sentially local transactions.2 0
2
Proponents of a dual banking system fear that the Federal Bank
Commission proposal would weaken the competitive position of state
banks. 20 3  The Bank Commission Act fails to devise methods to increase
state agency allocations. Only a single provision of the Act attempts
to strengthen the dual banking system. Section 312(d) of the Act
"' As previously stated, regulation-shopping between federal and state banking sys-
tems takes the form of conversions, see note 195 supra, whereas, regulation-shopping at
the federal level most often assumes the form of voluntary membership or withdrawal
from the Federal Reserve System.
19s L. RITTER & W. SILBER, PRINCIPLES OF MONEY, BANKING, AND FINANCIAL MARKETS
371 (1974), citing FIRST REP. OF THE ADVISORY COMM. ON COMMERCIAL BANK SUPERVISION,
submitted to the Superintendent of Banks of the State of New York 2-3 (Dec. 1965).
' The most serious impediment to the development of national banking policy is
federal inter-agency conflict rather than any state-federal discord incident to dual bank-
ing.
2 See J. COCHRAN, MONEY, BANKING, AND THE ECONOMY 73-74 (1975), for a compari-
son of chartering requirements in New York and Illinois with those for attaining national
bank status. See also R. KENT, MONEY AND BANKING 165-66 (1966). Generally, the
capital-stock requirements of newly organized state and national banks vary according
to the size of the cities in which the banks operate. Surplus requirements further mandate
that both state and national banks accumulate amounts equal to specified percentages of
the bank's capital stock. For example, Illinois law requires the establishment of surplus
of at least 10 percent of the capital and a reserve for operating expenses of at least 5 per-
cent to be provided at the time of incorporation. National bank chartering requirements
are considerably higher. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 21-28 (1970).
201 Competition among banks regulates both the prices charged for banking services
and the quality of service delivered; moreover, it provides an incentive for the efficient
use of resources by banking management. The tension between governmental regulation
and free-market competition is especially strong in the banking industry, in which bank
failures are viewed as an unacceptable result of free-market competition.
202 One problem is the determination of what is a "local" transaction. See Baker,
Chartering, Branching, and the Concentration Problem, in CURRENT PERSPECTIVES IN
BANKING: OPERATIONS, MANAGEMENT, AND REGULATION 415 (T. Havrilesky & J. Boorman
ed. 1976).
203 See notes 158-61 supra and accompanying text.
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provides for the exclusive state examination of state member banks
"[d]uring any period in which examinations made by or for a State
banking supervisory agency are, in the judgment of the Commission,
adequate to serve the purposes for which examinations are authorized.
... ,"204 Although section 312(d) would appear to increase state con-
trol over large banks residing within the state, its effectiveness could
well be emasculated by the Act's failure to adequately address the cur-
rent funding problems of state banking agencies .2 5  Without a sub-
stantial increase in capital allocations, most state banking agencies
would be unable to assume examination of state member banks. Addi-
tional legislation is, therefore, necessary to strengthen and promote the
dual banking system.
Although federal monetary support for dual banking must be gen-
erated through the Congress, the courts can do much to prevent the
further deterioration of state banking agencies by restricting increased
federal regulation of state banks. The courts have yet to establish
workable standards by which to balance state and federal banking in-
terests; however, some judicial direction may result from the recent Su-
preme Court case of National League of Cities v. Usery.206 In Usery,
the Supreme Court moved toward restricting congressional authority
under the commerce clause2 1 7 in cases of federal encroachment on the
"integral functions" of state and local governments. 0 8  The Court spe-
cifically invalidated the application of federal wage and hour regula-
tions to state and local government employees.20 9 This restriction of
21S. 684, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 312(d)(2), 123 CONG. REc. S2478 (daily ed. Feb. 10,
1977).
205 Id. Three aspects of § 312(d)(2) should be noted. First, pursuant to that section,
the Federal Bank Commission could suspend federal examination of state banks. Such
suspension, however, is discretionary; state agencies may or may not be permitted to as-
sume examination of state member and state nonmember insured banks. Secondly, the
section only allows for the state agency to assume examination functions. General regu-
latory control over state insured banks would remain within the Bank Commission.
Finally, the Act makes minimal provisions for state agency funding. The Commission
would be authorized to reimburse state agencies for all or part of the costs for examina-
tion of state nonmember insured banks from the federal deposit insurance fund. The
Act does not guarantee such reimbursements to state agencies. Moreover, it affords no
monetary allowance for state agency assumption of examination functions over state
member banks. This latter reimbursement provision was absent from the corresponding
portion of the 1975 bill. Compare S.2298, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. & 203(d), 121 CONG.
REC. 15378 (1975) with S.684, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 312(d)(2), 123 CONC. REc. S2478
(daily ed. Feb. 10, 1977).
- 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
207 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, endows Congress with the power: "To regulate com-
merce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with Indian tribes." Under
modem construction of the commerce clause, Congress is granted plenary power to regu-
late commercial activity with any appreciable effect on interstate commerce. See D.
ENGDAHL, CONSTITUTIONAL POWER: FEDERAL AND STATE IN A NUrSHELL § 5.01-05 (1974).
n' 426 U.S. at 851. In Usery, the Court found that the states' freedom to structure
employer-employee relations in areas such as fire and police protection, constituted an
"integral" part of state and local governments.
o Although the Court found that the establishment of wage and hour regulations was
within congressional authority under the commerce clause, the Court held that applica-
tion of these wage and hour provisions to the states was an unconstitutional exercise of
the federal commerce power. Id. at 845-46.
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Congress' plenary power under the commerce clause was a break with
established precedent and could signal a new construction of that
clause.2 10
Unfortunately, the Usery Court failed to articulate a workable stan-
dard for the limitation of the federal commerce power under the tenth
amendment.21 ' No balancing test was enunciated by the Court, al-
though it seemed to imply that any such test would be based on the
protection of "traditional [state] governmental functions. '" 21 2  The
Usery decision only suggested that federal intrusions into state affairs,
which are based on the interstate commerce power, should be ques-
tioned through some balancing of competing state and federal inter-
ests. The federal interest in uniform regulation of matters affecting
interstate commerce should be weighed against the state interest in
preserving a sphere of sovereign operations within the federalist sys-
tem.
213
The balancing test implicit in the Usery decision, therefore, suggests
that state banking authorities should be preserved, since banking regu-
lation may be deemed to constitute an integral revenue function of state
government. Moreover, the decision would appear to provide a constitu-
tional basis for congressional legislation to strengthen the dual banking
system.
IV. CONCLUSION
The present scheme of fragmented bank regulation is not only inef-
ficient, but it has promoted competitive inequalities among the several
bank classes. These disparities are most evident in the liberal Comp-
troller rulings which have permitted national banks to expand both ex-
ternally through merger and internally through entry into nonbank ser-
vice areas. Further problems with present regulation arise in connec-
tion with the "competition in laxity" that has developed among the
federal regulatory agencies. A regulatory scheme which allows banks
to switch regulators with impunity becomes a system of deregulation,
since "no agency is going to chase its constituents into the arms of a
more sympathetic regulator," 214 particularly if the agency's operating
budget is based on assessments levied against the banks it regulates.
210 Justice Brennan's dissent in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. at 856-80,
suggested that the majority ignored decades of commerce clause precedent in reaching its
decision. But see Note, Municipal Bankruptcy, the Tenth Amendment and the New
Federalism, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1871, 1874-78 (1976), which suggests that the Usery de-
cision was at least "foreshadowed by decisions in other cases exhibiting heightened
solicitude for states' interests."
'" Note, Municipal Bankruptcy, the Tenth Amendmeat and the New Federalism, 89
HARV. L. REV. at 1881-84; see also Note, State Governmeutal Immunity from Federal
Regulation Based on the Commerce Clause - National League of Cities v. Usery, 26
DEPAUL L. REV. 101, 114 (1976).
"21 426 U.S. at 851-52; Note, State Governmental Immunity from Federal Regulation
Based on the Commerce Clause - National League of Cities v. Usery, 26 DEPAUL L. REV.
at 117.
213 Id. at 118.
"1 1975 Hearings on S. 2298, supra note 10, at 66 (testimony of J. L. Robertson).
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While consolidation of the federal banking agencies under the Fed-
eral Bank Commission Act would not remedy all of the existing prob-
lems of bank regulation, it would eliminate the wasteful duplication of
effort associated with overlapping agency responsibilities and would
ensure consistency in federal regulatory decisions.
A major regulatory problem that is not resolvable by consolidation
emerges in conflicts between various economic policy goals for bank
regulation. For example, the policy conflicts between competitiveness
and soundness and between competitiveness and operating efficiency
would not solely be determined by any administrative restructuring,
however, the regulatory structure may significantly influence "the ex-
tent to which the realized trade-off between these various conflicting goals
approaches the optimum trade-off. '" 21 5  Consolidation of the federal
agencies would eliminate one level at which goal conflicts are presently
manifested. No longer would such policy conflicts arise from the inter-
play among federal regulators. Dissonance would remain within the
federal banking agency, but moves toward policy agreement would be
more immediately mandated than under the multiple-agency system.
The efficient operation of the Federal Bank Commission largely would
depend on achieving such agreement. Under the tripartite system, by
contrast, resolution of policy conflicts is inhibited. Although each
agency desires to resolve intra-agency conflicts in order to operate most
efficiently, there is no incentive to harmonize inter-agency policy con-
flicts. In fact, continued inter-agency conflict has sometimes been pro-
moted to attract banks to an agency. The Office of the Comptroller,
for example, seems to encourage such policy conflicts over bank expan-
sion issues, since it uses its expansionist policies to attract large banks
to national bank status. 21
6
A strengthened dual banking system is one means by which genuine
experimentation in policy development may be fostered. As previously
indicated, the Federal Bank Commission and state banking agencies
could provide separate laboratories for the resolution of banking policy
conflicts . 2 1  Deregulation of the banking industry, it has been argued,
would provide an alternative means to encourage banking experimenta-
tion. Resort to the rivalry of the marketplace would be expected to
produce a detrimental effect in reducing the number of banks in a given
market if smaller banks became unable to compete with larger banking
interests. The relationship between competition and industry innova-
tion is far from settled; 21 1 thus, predictions of increased banking inno-
vation related to deregulation seem highly speculative.
215 Guttentag, Reflections on Bank Regulatory Structure and Large Bank Failures,
in CURRENT PERSPECTIVES IN BANKING: OPERATIONS, MANAGEMENT, AND REGULATION 504
(T. Havrilesky & J. Boorman ed. 1976).
21 See notes 79-82 supra and accompanying text.
217 See notes 192-93 supra and accompanying text.
21I Although most would agree that competitive markets are conducive to industry
innovation, some economists argue that a monopolist has an incentive to innovate in or-
der to maintain his monopoly status or because he is less concerned than other business-
men that a competitor would steal his invention. See T. MORGAN, ECONOMIC REGULATION
OF BUSINESS: CASES AND MATERIALS 17 n.5 (1976). See generally Markham, Concert-
196]
37Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1976
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
Increased reliance on the market, moreover, would require a greater
assurance than presently exists that bank failures will not undermine
public confidence in the banking industry."' In light of the night-
marish bank runs of the 1930's, it is questionable whether the public
should be made to readily accept bank failures. Consequently, there
is a strong case to be made for the governmental protection of com-
mercial banks, since the failure of large banks would most likely set off
a chain of bank runs. 22 0
A final argument against deregulation is related to the ignorance of
bank depositors. In a free market economy, efficiencies are realized,
in part, Lecause buyers determine the volume of production .22  The
efficient functioning of this system is predicated on the belief that buyers
are best able to judge the desirability of a product or service.222  This
premise, however, does not hold in the area of commercial banking
regulation, where one of the critical factors in smooth market operations
is the maintenance of safe bank deposits. Because most depositors
would be unable to afford the costs of determining bank safety, some
governmental regulation in banking would appear warranted. 2 3
Federal consolidation and the dual banking system provide the struc-
tural skeletons for the development of effective banking policy reform.
By eliminating administrative overlap and inconsistency in decision-
making at the federal level, the Federal Bank Commission Act promises
to end two existing obstacles to such reform. Without substantive re-
forms, consolidation may itself prove counterproductive. Ostensibly,
the banking industry could more easily capture a consolidated agency
than a tripartite regulatory system.2 2 4
While the full scope and nature of necessary banking reforms may
only be determined through extensive empirical study, the problems at-
tendant to the present regulatory system dictate that some reform is
requisite to protect the public from unsound banking practices. That
such reform would necessitate an active rather than passive approach
to regulation would appear obvious.
tration: A Stimulus or Retardant to Innovation, in INIsTRIAL CONCENRnTION: THE New
LEARNING (H. Goldschmid, H. Mann & J. Weston ed. 1974).
219 Guttentag, Reflections in Bank Regulatory Structure and Large Bank Failures, in
CURRENT PERsPECTIVES IN BANKING: OPERATIONS, MANAGEMENT, AND REGULATION 511-12
(T. Havrilesky & J. Boorman ed. 1976). The author emphasizes that the most crucial
step toward reduction of the hazards associated with deposit payoff is the elimination of
the FDIC's insurance fund and its credit line with the Treasury.
22 See generally Mayer, Preventing the Failures of Large Banks, id. at 515.
221 In a model of pure competition, an optimum allocation of resources is ascertained
only after consumer preferences or community demands are known. See E. SINGER,
ArmmTusT EcoNoaucs: SELECrED LEGAL CASES AND ECONOMIC MODELS 23 (1968). By
contrast, in monopoly markets, output is restricted by the seller so that profits may be
maximized. Id. at 63.
222 Mayer, Preventing the Failures of Large Banks, in CUMrrENT PsPECTIVES IN
BANKING: OPzaATIONs, MANAGEMENT, AND REGULATION 516 (T. Havrilesky & J. Boorman
ed. 1976).
2MId.
224 1975 Hearings on S. 2298, supra note 10, at 237 (statement of Ralph Nader).
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[E]conomic statesmanship, as contrasted with economic engi-
neering, lies in recognizing the need for reforms and making
them in time; and "in time" means before a serious crisis arises
to compel remedial action to be taken. The history of banking
reform in the United States reflects little of the statesmanship
as thus defined.2
25
The recent failures of three large banking institutions should forewarn
regulators of the dangers manifest in the further promotion of laxity;
as yet, little reform has been instituted. Unless timely reforms are im-
plemented, current regulatory policies, or the lack thereof, could destroy
both the regulators and the regulated and threaten the effective opera-
tion of the economy. 226
LAURIE LEADER
225 Whittlesey, Examination and Supervision: Indications and Inferences, in COMPEN-
DIUM, supra note 35, at 619.
2'6 The numbers and size of bank failures have dramatically increased in recent years.
During the past four years, bank failures averaged $937 million in deposits annually, an
increase of 21 times over the average of $45 million among failed banks during the pre-
vious 13 years. Moreover, the recent bank failures, which included Franklin National
Bank and United States National Bank, were the largest in the nation's history. The
above information was obtained by the General Accounting Office in its audit of the three
federal banking agencies, and was filed with the Senate Banking Committee on January
31, 1977. The office also found that during the years 1971-75 the number of problem
banks rose from at least 352 to 607; during that same period, the number of problem banks
with deposits greater than $100 million increased from 13 to 83.
These figures suggest a dismal forecast for bank depositors. The problem is further
compounded by the fact that, in most cases, the General Accounting Office found that
bank examiners had identified the banking problems two years prior to failure; however,
the banking agencies were fatally tardy in requiring the correction of such failures. These
findings thus present, perhaps, the strongest case for federal consolidation and for regula-
tory reform. See 123 CONG. REc. S2470 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 1977) (remarks of Senator
William Proxmire).
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